Untraditional SecurityDECEMBER 24, 2021

US – China Bilateral Relationship and India’s Smart Move, Revealing Security and Prosperity

Team Red Lantern Analytica

Directorate of Intelligence

It took around ten months to organise the first bilateral meeting between the United States and China, during which President Joe Biden and Chinese Leader Xi Jinping expressed their concerns about the fragile relationship between the two countries. Certain decisions reflect the persistent insecurity of the two large nations’ ties. This tense situation is a source of concern for all countries. India is also impacted by this circumstance, as its relationship with China has deteriorated in recent years. which has led to the emergence of a strategic alliance between India and the United States. Numerous political experts have expressed concern that any rapprochement between the United States and China will jeopardise India’s relationship with China.India should exercise caution in its dealings with the United States and China. At the same time, India should not fret over Washington’s alliance with Beijing. China is a powerful country that is also vital to other countries, making it unthinkable to ignore it. India has maintained its ties with China despite China’s assault on Ladakh in 2020. In November 2021, India was coordinating its efforts with China at the COP26.

Each of Europe’s, Asia’s, and even India’s economic partners has a large stake in China’s fruitful economic relationship. Engagement with all of the world’s major countries, including China, is an unpleasant reality of international affairs. Although the gap has widened in recent years as a result of fundamental contradictions between the US and China, it is also true that it will be closed in the near future if nothing goes horribly wrong in US-China ties. A few years ago, President Donald Trump employed an anti-China campaign tactic to win the presidency, but after taking the oath of office, he invited Xi to his Florida estate. The Trump administration saw a deterioration in the bilateral relationship. Under Trump’s leadership, the US switched from compromising at all costs to pushing on a broad range of issues, including trade, technology, security, and global governance. Many political observers predicted that Biden would change the situation following Trump’s election, but Biden is proceeding more methodically by fortifying US relationships and focusing on domestic economic restoration. America is united in its determination to confront and address China’s danger, while Beijing is united in its determination to stand up to America. However, both presidents recognise the critical nature of bilateral relations and the need for prudent management of geopolitical rivalry and interdependence. The solution to the US-China relationship and India’s conundrum is to enhance its ties with all major countries, including the US, France, Japan, Europe, and Russia, thereby boosting India’s position in the club of great nations. The Biden administration is likely to continue expanding the bilateral relationship with India, with the driving force being China’s growing economic and military clout in the area. In 2017, the US, Japan, India, and Australia finalised a long-delayed proposal to form the “Quad”, or Quadrilateral coalition, to confront China’s aggressive behaviour in the Indo-Pacific area. President Joe Biden electronically visited Quad leaders, including Prime Minister Narendra Modi, during the bloc’s inaugural summit, where he stated that a free and open Indo-Pacific is critical for everyone and that the US is committed to achieving stability in the area with its partners and allies.

China is embroiled in bitter territorial conflicts in both the South and East China Seas. China asserts sovereign authority over the whole South China Sea. Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, and Taiwan have all filed rebuttal claims. To contain and counteract Chinese malfeasance, India must establish economic links with other Asian countries such as Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, and other bordering countries. This will provide India with a strong ally and backing in its dealings with China. Now is the time for India to demonstrate and establish that a nation can shape the global and regional balance of power. India, as the world’s largest market, can attract FDI, bolstering its economic stability and demonstrating to the world that the country will no longer stand by and watch as a victim nation, but will instead lead and intervene to resolve concerns and confront challenges.

Author:
Chandan Veer, Research Scholar (Ph.D.), Mahatma Gandhi Central University Bihar

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