UNTRADITIONAL SECURITYOCTOBER 13, 2026
01Why Calls to Revive SAARC Are About More Than Regional Cooperation
Why Calls to Revive SAARC Are About More Than Regional Cooperation Geopolitical positioning, institutional paralysis and the case for practical South Asian cooperation Rationale Founded in Dhaka in December 1985, SAARC brings together Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Its charter seeks to improve living standards, accelerate economic and social development, and strengthen collective self-reliance. Yet the organisation’s last summit was held in Kathmandu in November 2014. The 2016 Islamabad summit did not take place amid deteriorating India–Pakistan relations and the withdrawal of several participating states from the process. The result has been a prolonged institutional freeze, even as cross-border problems have become harder to manage in isolation. [1][2] The article notes call from Bangladesh and Maldives for SAARC to return to the negotiating table, alongside support for renewed regional engagement from Nepal and Bhutan. Bangladesh has also argued that SAARC and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) should work alongside one another rather than be treated as alternatives. Such statements matter, but a call for revival is not the same as an agreed roadmap, and neither necessarily indicates a willingness to resolve the political disputes that have paralysed the organisation. 1. The central obstacle is political, not merely administrative SAARC’s institutional design makes political goodwill indispensable. Article X of its charter requires decisions at every level to be unanimous and excludes bilateral and contentious issues from deliberations. The exclusion was intended to protect regional cooperation from being overwhelmed by disputes between neighbours. In practice, however, the combination of unanimity and deep bilateral mistrust has made it difficult to move forward when even one member is unwilling to participate. [1] This is the organisation’s central paradox: SAARC is designed to keep contentious disputes outside the room, but those disputes can determine whether the room is convened at all. India–Pakistan tensions have repeatedly obstructed summit-level engagement, while the deterioration of Pakistan–Afghanistan relations adds another layer of friction. The consequences are not confined to diplomacy. When leaders cannot meet, it becomes harder to secure political direction, approve ambitious initiatives and reassure officials that cross-border projects will survive the next crisis. Still, it would be too simple to attribute SAARC’s paralysis exclusively to one bilateral relationship. The consensus rule gives every member a veto, and weak implementation, limited institutional resources, uneven political commitment and low levels of regional economic interdependence have also constrained the organisation. A serious revival therefore requires more than a summit announcement. It requires a minimum political understanding that technical cooperation should continue even when high-level relations are strained. 2. Regionalism is also a tool of geopolitical balancing Smaller South Asian states do not make foreign-policy choices in a vacuum. They seek investment, infrastructure, security partnerships, market access and diplomatic support from multiple partners. China’s economic presence, the continuing importance of the United States, ties with Gulf countries and links with Southeast Asia all shape the choices available to governments across the region. Building such relationships is not, by itself, evidence of disloyalty to South Asian cooperation. It is a normal form of strategic diversification. The geopolitical question is how governments use these relationships. A renewed appeal to SAARC can help a state demonstrate that it wants a voice in regional affairs, avoid being seen as dependent on a single partner, or signal dissatisfaction with the limits of existing bilateral arrangements. It may also be a way of reminding India, the region’s largest economy and most geographically central state, that neighbouring countries value multilateral forums in which they can participate on a more formally equal footing. Bangladesh’s and Maldives’ efforts to deepen relationships beyond India illustrate the wider strategic setting described in the original draft. Chinese-backed infrastructure, potential security partnerships and engagement with Gulf states can expand policy options for these governments. But the inference must be handled carefully: external partnerships do not prove that calls for SAARC are insincere. A more defensible conclusion is that regional cooperation and geopolitical hedging can occur simultaneously. The real test is whether governments are prepared to translate their rhetoric into funded programmes, negotiated rules and sustained participation. For India, this creates a strategic dilemma. It may be reluctant to invest political capital in a forum where progress can be blocked and bilateral disputes may dominate the agenda. At the same time, prolonged disengagement can leave neighbouring states with fewer region-wide channels and make alternative groupings or external partners more attractive. A regional institution that is unable to deliver results can weaken India’s influence; an institution that works predictably could instead reinforce India’s role as a provider of regional public goods. 3. The economic case for cooperation remains compelling The weakness of SAARC is particularly striking when measured against the economic opportunities available to South Asia. The World Bank reports that intra-regional trade accounts for only about 5 per cent of South Asia’s total trade, compared with roughly 25 per cent in ASEAN. It estimates current trade among South Asian economies at around US$23 billion, well below an estimated potential of at least US$67 billion. High tariffs, non-tariff barriers, restrictions on investment, poor transport links and a persistent trust deficit all contribute to this gap. [3] These figures suggest that the region’s problem is not a lack of economic logic. It is the failure to convert geographical proximity into lower costs and dependable connections. Businesses can face more expensive and complicated trade with nearby countries than with distant markets. For landlocked Nepal and Bhutan, access to ports and efficient transit routes is especially important. For Bangladesh, improved links with India, Nepal and Bhutan can widen markets and make ports and transport corridors more productive. For India’s border states, regional commerce can support local firms, jobs and supply chains. The South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), which came into force in 2006, has not delivered the depth of integration originally anticipated. A tariff agreement alone cannot overcome closed or inefficient border crossings, inconsistent standards, weak logistics, payment constraints and political restrictions. Nor can regional
