Why Calls to Revive SAARC Are About More Than Regional Cooperation

Why Calls to Revive SAARC Are About More Than Regional Cooperation

Geopolitical positioning, institutional paralysis and the case for practical South Asian cooperation

Rationale

Founded in Dhaka in December 1985, SAARC brings together Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Its charter seeks to improve living standards, accelerate economic and social development, and strengthen collective self-reliance. Yet the organisation’s last summit was held in Kathmandu in November 2014. The 2016 Islamabad summit did not take place amid deteriorating India–Pakistan relations and the withdrawal of several participating states from the process. The result has been a prolonged institutional freeze, even as cross-border problems have become harder to manage in isolation. [1][2]

The article notes call from Bangladesh and Maldives for SAARC to return to the negotiating table, alongside support for renewed regional engagement from Nepal and Bhutan. Bangladesh has also argued that SAARC and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) should work alongside one another rather than be treated as alternatives. Such statements matter, but a call for revival is not the same as an agreed roadmap, and neither necessarily indicates a willingness to resolve the political disputes that have paralysed the organisation.

1. The central obstacle is political, not merely administrative

SAARC’s institutional design makes political goodwill indispensable. Article X of its charter requires decisions at every level to be unanimous and excludes bilateral and contentious issues from deliberations. The exclusion was intended to protect regional cooperation from being overwhelmed by disputes between neighbours. In practice, however, the combination of unanimity and deep bilateral mistrust has made it difficult to move forward when even one member is unwilling to participate. [1]

This is the organisation’s central paradox: SAARC is designed to keep contentious disputes outside the room, but those disputes can determine whether the room is convened at all. India–Pakistan tensions have repeatedly obstructed summit-level engagement, while the deterioration of Pakistan–Afghanistan relations adds another layer of friction. The consequences are not confined to diplomacy. When leaders cannot meet, it becomes harder to secure political direction, approve ambitious initiatives and reassure officials that cross-border projects will survive the next crisis.

Still, it would be too simple to attribute SAARC’s paralysis exclusively to one bilateral relationship. The consensus rule gives every member a veto, and weak implementation, limited institutional resources, uneven political commitment and low levels of regional economic interdependence have also constrained the organisation. A serious revival therefore requires more than a summit announcement. It requires a minimum political understanding that technical cooperation should continue even when high-level relations are strained.

2. Regionalism is also a tool of geopolitical balancing

Smaller South Asian states do not make foreign-policy choices in a vacuum. They seek investment, infrastructure, security partnerships, market access and diplomatic support from multiple partners. China’s economic presence, the continuing importance of the United States, ties with Gulf countries and links with Southeast Asia all shape the choices available to governments across the region. Building such relationships is not, by itself, evidence of disloyalty to South Asian cooperation. It is a normal form of strategic diversification.

The geopolitical question is how governments use these relationships. A renewed appeal to SAARC can help a state demonstrate that it wants a voice in regional affairs, avoid being seen as dependent on a single partner, or signal dissatisfaction with the limits of existing bilateral arrangements. It may also be a way of reminding India, the region’s largest economy and most geographically central state, that neighbouring countries value multilateral forums in which they can participate on a more formally equal footing.

Bangladesh’s and Maldives’ efforts to deepen relationships beyond India illustrate the wider strategic setting described in the original draft. Chinese-backed infrastructure, potential security partnerships and engagement with Gulf states can expand policy options for these governments. But the inference must be handled carefully: external partnerships do not prove that calls for SAARC are insincere. A more defensible conclusion is that regional cooperation and geopolitical hedging can occur simultaneously. The real test is whether governments are prepared to translate their rhetoric into funded programmes, negotiated rules and sustained participation.

For India, this creates a strategic dilemma. It may be reluctant to invest political capital in a forum where progress can be blocked and bilateral disputes may dominate the agenda. At the same time, prolonged disengagement can leave neighbouring states with fewer region-wide channels and make alternative groupings or external partners more attractive. A regional institution that is unable to deliver results can weaken India’s influence; an institution that works predictably could instead reinforce India’s role as a provider of regional public goods.

3. The economic case for cooperation remains compelling

The weakness of SAARC is particularly striking when measured against the economic opportunities available to South Asia. The World Bank reports that intra-regional trade accounts for only about 5 per cent of South Asia’s total trade, compared with roughly 25 per cent in ASEAN. It estimates current trade among South Asian economies at around US$23 billion, well below an estimated potential of at least US$67 billion. High tariffs, non-tariff barriers, restrictions on investment, poor transport links and a persistent trust deficit all contribute to this gap. [3]

These figures suggest that the region’s problem is not a lack of economic logic. It is the failure to convert geographical proximity into lower costs and dependable connections. Businesses can face more expensive and complicated trade with nearby countries than with distant markets. For landlocked Nepal and Bhutan, access to ports and efficient transit routes is especially important. For Bangladesh, improved links with India, Nepal and Bhutan can widen markets and make ports and transport corridors more productive. For India’s border states, regional commerce can support local firms, jobs and supply chains.

The South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), which came into force in 2006, has not delivered the depth of integration originally anticipated. A tariff agreement alone cannot overcome closed or inefficient border crossings, inconsistent standards, weak logistics, payment constraints and political restrictions.

Nor can regional trade grow if firms doubt that access will remain available during a diplomatic crisis. A revived SAARC process would therefore need to focus on implementation: simplifying customs procedures, publishing transparent rules of origin, improving border infrastructure, recognising standards where feasible and creating channels to resolve technical trade disputes.

Regionalism should also be judged by who benefits. Small businesses, farmers, women-led enterprises and communities near borders may gain from cheaper transport and wider markets, but they can also be left out if new corridors mainly serve large firms or if border communities face sudden restrictions. SAARC’s legitimacy would be stronger if its economic agenda included measurable targets for small-enterprise participation, labour mobility where politically feasible, and access to education, health services and digital payments.

4. BIMSTEC and bilateral diplomacy are alternatives, but not substitutes

The rise of BIMSTEC reflects a pragmatic response to SAARC’s deadlock. It brings together Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand, connecting South Asia with Southeast Asia around the Bay of Bengal. Its charter entered into force on 20 May 2024, giving the organisation a firmer legal foundation. The group has developed cooperation across areas including connectivity, security, energy, trade, climate and people-to-people links. [4][5]

BIMSTEC has practical advantages: it excludes Pakistan, places greater emphasis on the Bay of Bengal and creates opportunities for India to connect its eastern and north-eastern regions with neighbouring economies and Southeast Asia. Yet its membership does not cover all of South Asia, and it cannot by itself address region-wide issues involving Pakistan and Afghanistan. Treating BIMSTEC as a complete replacement for SAARC would leave important geographical and political gaps.

Bilateral arrangements have also produced concrete outcomes where governments have been willing to cooperate. Transport links, port access, electricity trade and cross-border infrastructure can move ahead between willing partners even when region-wide consensus is absent. The World Bank’s regional integration work highlights the potential of improved transport and energy connections, including cooperation among Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal. [2][6] These smaller arrangements can build habits of cooperation and demonstrate practical gains.

The most useful model is therefore not a contest in which SAARC, BIMSTEC and bilateral diplomacy must defeat one another. They can operate at different levels. Bilateral agreements can tackle specific projects; subregional frameworks can coordinate infrastructure and energy; BIMSTEC can deepen Bay of Bengal links; and SAARC can provide an inclusive forum for issues that require all eight South Asian members. The challenge is to avoid duplicated institutions and ensure that progress in one forum does not become an excuse to neglect another.

5. Climate, water and disaster risks make non-cooperation costly

Geopolitical analysis can make regional cooperation sound optional. Geography makes it less so. Floods, cyclones, droughts, heatwaves, air pollution and changing monsoon patterns cross national borders. The region’s rivers connect upstream decisions with downstream livelihoods, while extreme weather can disrupt food production, transport, energy supply and public health across several countries at once. The World Bank has stressed that South Asia’s exposure to disasters and climate change creates a strong case for regional approaches to resilience. [7]

These are areas where governments can begin without resolving their most sensitive security disputes. Shared flood forecasting, compatible early-warning systems, exchanges of meteorological data, joint disaster-response exercises, public-health surveillance and technical dialogue on river-basin management can produce direct benefits. Such cooperation does not remove sovereignty concerns; it gives states practical ways to protect their citizens while retaining control over national policy.

Public health offers a similar opportunity. Disease surveillance, emergency procurement, training for health professionals and information-sharing can help countries respond faster to outbreaks. Cooperation on food security and agricultural research can support farmers facing similar pests, weather extremes and price shocks. SAARC’s record in technical and social cooperation should not be dismissed simply because its summit process is stalled. But any renewed programme should be assessed by implementation and outcomes, not by the number of declarations issued.

6. What a credible revival would require

A realistic revival should begin with a narrow, deliverable agenda rather than a grand declaration of regional unity. First, members could agree on a schedule for technical meetings and restore regular contact among relevant ministries. Second, they could identify a small set of projects with clear timelines, responsible agencies and public progress reports. Third, they could protect technical cooperation from political disruption by maintaining expert-level channels during periods of diplomatic tension, while recognising that major decisions would still require member-state consent.

Fourth, SAARC members should revisit the practical effects of the unanimity rule without pretending that institutional reform can erase political mistrust. Any change would require agreement among the members, and a proposal that states view as threatening their sovereignty is unlikely to succeed. More achievable steps might include clearer project implementation procedures, voluntary coalitions of willing members where the charter permits, and transparent reporting on stalled commitments. Fifth, cooperation should be linked to existing platforms rather than built in isolation. SAARC and BIMSTEC could exchange information and coordinate where their mandates overlap, especially on disaster management, public health, connectivity and climate resilience.

Finally, revival must be reciprocal. India would need to see credible commitments that regional forums will deliver practical cooperation rather than become arenas for diplomatic point-scoring. Smaller members would need confidence that their interests will be heard and that economic ties with India can develop without requiring them to abandon partnerships elsewhere. Pakistan and India would need to accept, at minimum, that technical and humanitarian cooperation can be worthwhile even when broader political disputes remain unresolved. No institutional design can guarantee this political choice, but a focused agenda could make the costs of non-cooperation more visible.

Conclusion: the test is delivery, not declarations

Calls to restore SAARC are indeed entangled with geopolitical positioning. Governments use regional forums to preserve diplomatic options, balance external relationships and influence the regional agenda. Yet interpreting every revival proposal as strategic theatre would be as misleading as treating it as proof of a new era of South Asian unity. The same state can seek external investment, pursue bilateral deals and still benefit from regional coordination.

The deeper problem is that South Asia has not built institutions capable of insulating practical cooperation from political rivalry. SAARC’s long pause is a symptom of that failure, while low intra-regional trade shows its economic cost. BIMSTEC and bilateral initiatives can keep some forms of cooperation moving, but neither fully replaces an inclusive South Asian forum.

A credible SAARC revival would therefore be modest in its promises and strict about delivery: regular meetings, measurable projects, transparent implementation and sustained technical cooperation on shared risks. The question is not simply whether SAARC should return. It is whether its members are prepared to make regional cooperation useful even when geopolitics remains difficult.

References

[1] South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Secretariat. (n.d.). About SAARC. https://saarc-sec.org/index.php/about-saarc/about-saarc

[2] World Bank. (n.d.). One South Asia: Regional integration, cooperation and engagement. https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/south-asia-regional-integration/overview

[3] World Bank. (n.d.). Trade. One South Asia. https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/south-asia-regional-integration/trade

[4] BIMSTEC Secretariat. (2024, May 20). BIMSTEC Charter enters into force. https://bimstec.org/index.php/event/190/bimstec-charter-enters-into-force

[5] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (2025). India-BIMSTEC relations. https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India-BIMSTE-2025.pdf

[6] World Bank. (2022, June 28). Regional trade and connectivity in South Asia gets more than $1 billion boost from World Bank. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/06/28/regional-trade-and-connectivity-in-south-asia-gets-more-than-1-billion-boost-from-world-bank

[7] World Bank. (n.d.). Climate change. One South Asia. https://www.worldbank.org/en/programs/south-asia-regional-integration/climate-change

[8] Prime Minister’s Office, Government of India. (2014, November 27). Kathmandu Declaration: Eighteenth SAARC Summit, Kathmandu, Nepal. https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/kathmandu-declaration-eighteenth-saarc-summit-kathmandu-nepal-26-27-november-2014/