Untraditional SecurityOCTOBER 17, 2024

The Need for UNSC Reforms

Team Red Lantern Analytica

Directorate of Intelligence

Amidst the growing global conflict, particularly between Ukraine-Russia and the Middle East crisis involving the Arab nations and Israel, calls for more equaitable representation of the UNSC have increased even though it has been on the agenda of the UN General Assembly since 1979 in order to increase the Council’s legitimacy and effectiveness in shaping the global world order.

At the G4 Summit, which took place in Septemeber 2024, the ministers of the four nations underlined the same need for expansion of the UN Security Council. The ministers of the Group of Four (G4) nations, during the “Summit of Future” reiterated their stance for urgent reforms of the UN to “better reflect contemporary geopolitical realities” and thus become fit for the present and the future.

An year before, in November 2023, Dennis Francis, the President of the UNGA also highlighted the need for structural reforms in the Security Council at the Assembly’s annual debate assessing the UN forum for peace and security. The UN Premier was unambiguous in stating that the UNSC was “dangerously falling short” of its mandate as the primary custodian for the maintenance of international peace and security.

He also emphasized the need for reforms to make the UNSC more relevant as follows:

“Violence and war continue to spread in regions across the world, while the United Nations seems paralyzed due largely to the divisions in the Security Council. Absent structural reform, its performance and legitimacy will inevitably continue to suffer – and so too, the credibility and relevance of the UN itself.”

Similarly, grasping the vein of the failure of UNSC in bringing about a stalemate in the Israel-Palestine crisis because of the failure of passing effective resolutions since the crisis heightened, other UN Member States also underscored the need for reform as “urgent than ever”.

Jamal Fares Alrowaiei, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Bahrain (speaking on behalf of the Arab nations), stated in no uncertain terms that the credibility of the UNSC was in danger because of the use of the veto power in an arbitrary manner. He also urged member states to ensure conflict prevention efforts were more “representative, transparent, neutral and credible”.

Antje Leendertse, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Germany (speaking on behalf of the Group of Four) said that the Council was not as “effective as needs be” in addressing contemporary challenges because of its current composition. She underpinned the skewed composition of the Council as the major reason why it had been “unable to live up to expectations in addressing some of the most serious threats to international peace and security in a timely and effective manner”.

On the other hand, India has also consistently held the same position over the Council’s reforms and called for a “reformed multilateralism” especially during times of crisis such as in the present day. For example, during the fallout of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, the then Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee asserted that “until the UN Security Council is reformed and restructured, its decisions cannot reflect truly the collective will of the community of nations.” Add the latest statements made by PM and FM

History of the UNSC

The UNSC is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations with the mantle of ensuring international peace and security, approving changes to the UN Charter and also admission of new members to the General Assembly. It was created after World War 2 to address the failings of the League of Nations in maintaining world peace.

When it was established in 1945, the five victorious parties, China, US, UK, France and Russia were considered to be “better placed” to ensure international peace and security. However, considering the increase in membership from 51 to 193 states in the UN, many people judge the Security Council to be unrepresentative of the global order, especially in the light of the geopolitical changes that have taken place since decolonization and the end of the Cold War.

The UN Charter was formulated by the victors of the World War in their own national interests while assigning the permanent seats and the veto power amongst themselves. Moreover, any reform to the Security Council would require an amendment to the Charter which itself can only be brought about when adopted by two-thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified by two-thirds of the members of the UN, including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

The only significant reform that took place in the Security Council occurred in 1965 when the non-permanent membership was increased from 6 to 10 nations. In his “Agenda for Peace” published in 1992 the then Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali underlined his motivation to restructure the composition and arguably “anachronistic procedures” of the UN organ to recognize the changed world. Since then, the discrepancy between the strcuture of the UNSC and the global reality have become even more pronounced with politicians, scholars and diplomats arguing for a more representative and egalitarian playing field in the Council.

Since 1992, Japan, Germany, India and Brazil (also known as the G4 nations) have mutually suppoted each other’s bid in the Security Council, the former two being the second and third largest contributor to the UN respectively while the latter two are the most powerful nations within their regional groups and major players within their regions. On the other hand, their rivals, also known as the United for Consensus (Italy, Mexico, Pakistan, Argentina, Colombia, South Korea, Turkey and others) group have opposed their candidature as they are the economic competitors and regional rivals of the G4.

They have instead prompted for semi-permanent seats or the expansion of the number of temporary seats.

India’s bid consolidated by economic and diplomatic rise

India’s bid to the UNSC is largely driven by its rise as and economic and military power. It is a founding member of the United Nations. Two years before independence in 1947 (under the British Raj) India joined the UN as one of the largest contributors to the UN Peace Keeping missions. In the past 50 years, more than 1,00,000 Indian troops have served in the UN missions, citing which US President Barack Obama supported India’s bid as a permanent member of the UNSC attributing it to “India’s long history as a leading contributor to United Nations peacekeeping missions” in November 2010.

Meanwhile, the World Economic Outlook of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts that India will become the third largest economy of the world with the GDP averaging 6.3 per cent, boost in becoming a manufacturing and export hub, excellent digital infrastructure, investment in labour reforms and human capital, thereby surpasssing Japan and Germany in 2027-28. Also, India had a incredible year in 2023 as it held Presidency of the G20, the world’s highest profile economic gathering whereby the African Union was included in the G20 club, hence showcasing the diplomatic prowess of the nation.

Apart from that, India also helped launch partnerships such as the Global Biofuel Alliance, the Global Initiative of Digital Health, reform of the Sustainable Development Goals and multilateral development banks and the upscaling of digital infrastrcuture, thereby arraying India’s economic heft in achieving global consensus amidst and amongst critical issues. As fara as initiatives on environment sustainaibility are concerned, India has taken a pivotal role through the launch of the Mission LiFE of Lifestyle for Environment, coupled with a concerted push for Green Hydrogen. It has also pushed for a “global grid” for renewables and launched the International Solar Alliance and the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure. At the COP28 in Dubai, Prime Minister Narendra Modi also introduced the Green Credit Initiative as a substitute for carbon credits.

In the light of India’s growing might both on the diplomatic and the economic front, 4 out of the 5 permanent members of the UN have supported India’s bid in the Council, the latest being UK and France. In October 2024, British Prime Minister Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron publicly endorsed India’s bid to join the council. US President Joe Biden, during a visit by Modi to the US last month said Washington recognised a need to reform global institutions to “reflect India’s important voice”. Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov also said in July that his country was in support of India getting a permanent seat on the council.

On its behalf, India’s External Affairs Minister S.Jaishankar has called for a “more representative” UN.

Reverting to Prime Minister Modi’s statement last year in July,

“How can we talk of it as a primary organ of a global body, when entire continents of Africa and Latin America are ignored? How can it claim to speak for the world when its most populous country, and its largest democracy, is not a permanent member?”,

the minister has emphasized that “large parts of the world cannot be left behind when deciding the key issues of the times”.

Thus, India advocates for increasing both permanent and non-permanent members in the Council, the new members beings the G4 nations and two countries nominated by the African Union at the UN. India also insists that all permanent members of the Council should possess a veto and that it should be used only in “exceptional” circumstances and should avoid “blocking” enforcement action in riposte to heinous acts such as genocide and war crimes.

To make the Council more equitable and transparent, India proposes reforms such as greater consultation with non-members, more institutionalized access to council deliberations, curbing practices such as hidden veto and more regular and robust reporting to the General Assembly. According to the Global Policy Forum, “Permanent members use the hidden veto mainly in closed-door informal consultations, rather than in official open meetings. Since the late 1980s, the Council largely conducts its business in such private sessions. Away from the public and without any record of what has been said, the P5 have more freedom to pressure, threaten, and even bully other members of the Council.

By giving private veto warnings before a vote takes place, the P5 can “convince” Council members to shift their position and still persuade the international public of their good intentions.”

Authored By:
Gaurav Sharma ,
Guest Writer

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