Untraditional SecurityDECEMBER 11, 2022

Strengthening QUADrelateral Security Dialogue “QUAD” cooperation in the field of information security

Team Red Lantern Analytica

Directorate of Intelligence

The Asia-Pacific region is a gigantic region, where the total population today exceeds 3 billion people, which is about 60% of the world’s population. In the Asia-Pacific region today there is a certain zone of contact between the main geostrategic interests of the most important states of the world.

The Asia-Pacific region is an important area of the maritime strategic partnership between the United States and its allies within the framework of the American concept of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”. The architecture of the Indo-Pacific strategy includes, along with the United States, three more states that play an important role in the Pacific and Indian Oceans: Japan, India, and Australia. Based on the QUAD mechanism, which is a key component of the strategy, these four countries are trying to build a comprehensive structure of cooperation in two oceans, which includes politics, security, economics, science, technology and infrastructure. The strengthening of the position of this treaty has a devastating effect on the existing multilateral mechanisms in the region. In addition, by virtue of American new initiatives, Japan, India, and Australia are getting dominant mechanisms in the regions of the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

This article outlines the concept of a new QUAD initiatives – Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA), QUAD Cybersecurity Partnership and seeks to answer questions – which of the QUAD members is most interested in the initiatives? What are the nuances of the positions of the participating countries? What are the implementation difficulties?

The decision to create a common system for monitoring the earth’s surface based on the results of satellite reconnaissance was an unexpected addition, announced after the Tokyo Summit of QUAD member countries in May 2022. Experts[1] believe that the main feature of the new idea is the closer interaction of QUAD working groups in order to create a system for collecting and transmitting information obtained using technical means by conducting electronic (SIGINT) and geospatial (GEOINT) intelligence.

The advantage of the system is that ships can be detected from satellites almost in real time even with transponders turned off (AIS system), which will help fight against the “shadow fleet”. ” Because of its commercial origin, this data will be unclassified, allowing the QUAD to provide it to a wide range of partners who wish to benefit.”, the statement explains[2].

The developers of the QUAD information exchange system place special emphasis on its low cost and sufficiently high efficiency, which is especially important in the context of the global economic crisis and rising inflation in various countries of the world.

At the same time, it is assumed that SIGINT will continue to specialize in collecting classified information, primarily related to military preparations and the transfer of PRC forces, which is especially important for India and Japan. GEOINT in addition to this will take over the tracking of non-traditional threats and challenges associated, for example, with climate change, illegal fishing, mass migration, humanitarian and man-made disasters.

As part of the IPMDA[3], countries in the Indo-Pacific region intend to exchange technologies that allow them to control their maritime borders and international sea routes using low-orbit satellites that identify ships by radio traffic and automated tracking systems.

According to analysts, the new information exchange system through the QUAD Satellite Data Portal[4] (QSDP) created by the QUAD Space Working Group will be able to cover the entire volume of electronic and satellite intelligence information received both by the QUAD participants themselves and their partners. The communication function of the QSDP is expected to be similar to the low Earth orbit communications satellites system – ORBCOMM. Thus, the unified information satellite system will be able to capture the user’s signal and transmit it to another satellite or to a control center that is part of local communication networks.

States with vast maritime economic zones extending 200 nautical miles (370 km) from the coast often do not have the resources to effectively monitor thousands of square miles of coastal waters[5]. The IPMDA will establish near real-time regional water control centers throughout the Indo-Pacific region.

The system will be based on existing monitoring centers in India, Singapore, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. This initiative was reinforced by the announcement of an agreement on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the region (QUAD Partnership on Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief in the Indo-Pacific – HADR). Continuous surveillance will also allow monitoring of flight activities in the Woody and Spratly Island groups, construction activities in Fiery Cross, Mischief, and Subi reefs, as well as increasing the possibility of further deployment of A2/AD weapons. It seems that the implementation of this initiative is not only humanitarian, but also strategic in nature and will be used in the interests of the US naval forces in the region[6].

Linking the American Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) with India’s C4ISR capabilities (Integrated Air Command and Control System -IACCS and Indian Navy’s Information Management and Analysis Centre – IMAC) will facilitate secure data transmission and provide QUAD countries with a common operational picture. Connecting the two networks will also allow QUAD to create a composite picture of air and surface activity and facilitate the exchange of huge SIGINT and IMINT information.

In the future, the Unified Maritime Domain Awareness System will be able to work in parallel with such civilian structures that collect commercial data, such as, for example, the Swiss company Kleos radio frequency sensing system available on the satellite information market. At present, it allows governments and competent authorities of various countries to effectively counter the smuggling of weapons and drugs. It is also worth paying attention to the satellite regional time transfer system and a satellite-based augmentation system developed by the Japanese government to enhance the United States-operated Global Positioning System (GPS) in the Asia-Oceania regions – Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS).

In addition, one of the steps for the information systems integration is the use of mobile systems to create interoperability of equipment from different manufacturers and software Open RAN (Radio Access Network for Mobile Communications) Track 1.5 in the 5G field to improve interoperability and security in the telecommunications sector[7]. O-RAN Alliance takes part in this initiative – develops and promotes standards and protocols aimed at equipment and software compatibility, and Telecom Infra Project – is responsible for checking the software compatibility and different equipment.

Among the sticking points of the creating an effective mechanism for a new information exchange channel within the framework of QUAD, foreign analysts[8] emphasize the persistence of significant differences in the levels and possibilities of obtaining data of interest to the participants in the dialogue, as well as the need to harmonize their legal affairs governing the transfer of classified information to representatives of foreign states. An equally serious hindrance is the threat of a strong reaction from China, which make QUAD participants, with the exception of the United States, do IPMDA with the utmost caution, especially avoiding transferring this process to an official legal framework.

Since the next QUAD summit is to be held next year in Australia, and this country is also an ally of the United States and a member of the “defensive” alliance AUKUS, one of the foundations of which is declared technological cooperation, we can expect new decisions to be made there as well.

[1] https://thediplomat.com/2022/10/how-to-make-the-indo-pacific-partnership-for-maritime-domain-awareness-work/

[2] https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/05/23/fact-sheet-QUAD-leaders-tokyo-summit-2022/

[3] https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-quad-china-and-maritime-domain-awareness-in-the-indo-pacific/

[4] https://spacenews.com/QUAD-nations-unveil-satellite-based-maritime-monitoring-initiative/

[5] https://share.america.gov/QUAD-partners-help-indo-pacific-countries-monitor-waters/

[6] https://www.cnbc.com/2022/06/09/quads-maritime-initiative-could-spur-militarization-of-indo-pacific.html

[7] https://www.openranpolicy.org/statement-on-the-QUAD-leaders-tokyo-summit-2022/

[8] https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/energy/what-is-the-QUAD-and-should-china-fear-it/2022/05/19/10ef5c8c-d7a1-11ec-be17-286164974c54_story.html

Related Intelligence

UNTRADITIONAL SECURITYOCTOBER 13, 2026

Why Calls to Revive SAARC Are About More Than Regional Cooperation

Why Calls to Revive SAARC Are About More Than Regional Cooperation Geopolitical positioning, institutional paralysis and the case for practical South Asian cooperation Rationale Founded in Dhaka in December 1985, SAARC brings together Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Its charter seeks to improve living standards, accelerate economic and social development, and strengthen collective self-reliance. Yet the organisation’s last summit was held in Kathmandu in November 2014. The 2016 Islamabad summit did not take place amid deteriorating India–Pakistan relations and the withdrawal of several participating states from the process. The result has been a prolonged institutional freeze, even as cross-border problems have become harder to manage in isolation. [1][2] The article notes call from Bangladesh and Maldives for SAARC to return to the negotiating table, alongside support for renewed regional engagement from Nepal and Bhutan. Bangladesh has also argued that SAARC and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) should work alongside one another rather than be treated as alternatives. Such statements matter, but a call for revival is not the same as an agreed roadmap, and neither necessarily indicates a willingness to resolve the political disputes that have paralysed the organisation. 1. The central obstacle is political, not merely administrative SAARC’s institutional design makes political goodwill indispensable. Article X of its charter requires decisions at every level to be unanimous and excludes bilateral and contentious issues from deliberations. The exclusion was intended to protect regional cooperation from being overwhelmed by disputes between neighbours. In practice, however, the combination of unanimity and deep bilateral mistrust has made it difficult to move forward when even one member is unwilling to participate. [1] This is the organisation’s central paradox: SAARC is designed to keep contentious disputes outside the room, but those disputes can determine whether the room is convened at all. India–Pakistan tensions have repeatedly obstructed summit-level engagement, while the deterioration of Pakistan–Afghanistan relations adds another layer of friction. The consequences are not confined to diplomacy. When leaders cannot meet, it becomes harder to secure political direction, approve ambitious initiatives and reassure officials that cross-border projects will survive the next crisis. Still, it would be too simple to attribute SAARC’s paralysis exclusively to one bilateral relationship. The consensus rule gives every member a veto, and weak implementation, limited institutional resources, uneven political commitment and low levels of regional economic interdependence have also constrained the organisation. A serious revival therefore requires more than a summit announcement. It requires a minimum political understanding that technical cooperation should continue even when high-level relations are strained. 2. Regionalism is also a tool of geopolitical balancing Smaller South Asian states do not make foreign-policy choices in a vacuum. They seek investment, infrastructure, security partnerships, market access and diplomatic support from multiple partners. China’s economic presence, the continuing importance of the United States, ties with Gulf countries and links with Southeast Asia all shape the choices available to governments across the region. Building such relationships is not, by itself, evidence of disloyalty to South Asian cooperation. It is a normal form of strategic diversification. The geopolitical question is how governments use these relationships. A renewed appeal to SAARC can help a state demonstrate that it wants a voice in regional affairs, avoid being seen as dependent on a single partner, or signal dissatisfaction with the limits of existing bilateral arrangements. It may also be a way of reminding India, the region’s largest economy and most geographically central state, that neighbouring countries value multilateral forums in which they can participate on a more formally equal footing. Bangladesh’s and Maldives’ efforts to deepen relationships beyond India illustrate the wider strategic setting described in the original draft. Chinese-backed infrastructure, potential security partnerships and engagement with Gulf states can expand policy options for these governments. But the inference must be handled carefully: external partnerships do not prove that calls for SAARC are insincere. A more defensible conclusion is that regional cooperation and geopolitical hedging can occur simultaneously. The real test is whether governments are prepared to translate their rhetoric into funded programmes, negotiated rules and sustained participation. For India, this creates a strategic dilemma. It may be reluctant to invest political capital in a forum where progress can be blocked and bilateral disputes may dominate the agenda. At the same time, prolonged disengagement can leave neighbouring states with fewer region-wide channels and make alternative groupings or external partners more attractive. A regional institution that is unable to deliver results can weaken India’s influence; an institution that works predictably could instead reinforce India’s role as a provider of regional public goods. 3. The economic case for cooperation remains compelling The weakness of SAARC is particularly striking when measured against the economic opportunities available to South Asia. The World Bank reports that intra-regional trade accounts for only about 5 per cent of South Asia’s total trade, compared with roughly 25 per cent in ASEAN. It estimates current trade among South Asian economies at around US$23 billion, well below an estimated potential of at least US$67 billion. High tariffs, non-tariff barriers, restrictions on investment, poor transport links and a persistent trust deficit all contribute to this gap. [3] These figures suggest that the region’s problem is not a lack of economic logic. It is the failure to convert geographical proximity into lower costs and dependable connections. Businesses can face more expensive and complicated trade with nearby countries than with distant markets. For landlocked Nepal and Bhutan, access to ports and efficient transit routes is especially important. For Bangladesh, improved links with India, Nepal and Bhutan can widen markets and make ports and transport corridors more productive. For India’s border states, regional commerce can support local firms, jobs and supply chains. The South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), which came into force in 2006, has not delivered the depth of integration originally anticipated. A tariff agreement alone cannot overcome closed or inefficient border crossings, inconsistent standards, weak logistics, payment constraints and political restrictions. Nor can regional

AdminAnalyst

arrow_outward

UNTRADITIONAL SECURITYAUGUST 14, 2026

Myanmar at a Crossroad: Mapping Political Evolution & Future Pathways

Myanmar at a Crossroad: Mapping Political Evolution & Future Pathways Red Lantern Analytica presents a new research report, “Myanmar at a Crossroad: Mapping Political Evolution & Future Pathways,” authored by Lt Col Ujjwal Abhishek Jha, Retd. The report traces Myanmar’s political evolution from independence in 1948, examining the country’s transition from an early parliamentary democracy to prolonged military rule and the recurring cycles of political upheaval and resistance. It explores the historical foundations of Myanmar’s political fragility, the legacy of colonial rule, the country’s post-independence trajectory, and the major turning points that have shaped its contemporary political landscape. The analysis seeks to map Myanmar’s present political crossroads and examine the possible pathways shaping its future, offering a structured perspective on the forces influencing the country’s political evolution. To Download PDF of this report click here

AdminAnalyst

arrow_outward

UNTRADITIONAL SECURITYAUGUST 12, 2026

Europe Without Russian Energy

How far has Europe actually moved away from Russian energy? In this report, Aadvik Chauhan examines the EU’s transition from political commitments to legally binding restrictions on Russian gas imports, while assessing the continuing role of Russian energy in Europe’s supply structure. The analysis explores energy security, divergent positions among EU member states, infrastructure constraints, renewable energy growth, and the strategic implications of Europe’s attempt to reduce dependence on Russia. The report also examines the paradox of rising Russian gas imports during the early stages of the 2026 phase-out and considers why 2027 could prove decisive for assessing the depth of Europe’s energy transition. To Download PDF of this report click here

AdminAnalyst

arrow_outward