Untraditional SecurityFEBRUARY 7, 2024

Press Release of Book discussion Session on ‘China Betrays Again’

Team Red Lantern Analytica

Directorate of Intelligence

On January 28, 2024, Red Lantern Analytica hosted a Book discussion on ‘China Betrays Again’. Maj. Gen. Ashok Kumar VSM, Author of the Book, Kargil War Veteran & Military Expert; Air Commodore S.P. Singh VSM, Strategic Analyst & Senior Fellow at Centre For Air Power Studies (CAPS); Major Amit Bansal, Defence Strategist and War Veteran; Major Aparajita Pandey, Army Officer (Retd.) and Cyber Expert and Dr Vinay Kumar, Assistant Professor at National Law University, Aurangabad were the expert speakers of the webinar.

Air Commodore S.P. Singh hailed the Book ‘China Betrays Again’ as the best on the India-China subject highlighting its comprehensive analysis of every issue in great detail. He elaborated on how the book offers in-depth insight into various aspects of India and China relations ranging from Buddhism to how the countries became victims of imperialism and all the conflicts after 1947.

Air Commodore Singh stressed on various issues which are the bone of contention between India and China in modern times. He mentioned that, in 1987, Arunachal Pradesh attained statehood, the problems between India and China surged and after that relations didn’t turn back to normal. He further added that after Pokhran, tensions grew even further. The other issues which impact India and China relations adversely include China opposing the proposal by India to blacklist the Pak-based Jaish-e Mohammed terrorist Mashoor Azhar case in the UN, China’s tilt towards Pakistan since 1962, China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), string of pearls, border dispute, standoff along the border, etc. “India joining various multilateral forums I2U2, QUAD, Joint military exercise with Japan and France, etc. is helping the £Indoa to deter China,” asserted Mr Singh. He also added that India’s self-reliance in defence manufacturing has given India little edge in dealing with India. “There is a need to increase our diplomatic, multilateral forums and economic reach to keep a check on China and have a peaceful border,” he expressed. Mr Singh concluded by stating that the book is a great asset for all those who want to learn more about China and an absolute must-read. It will be of great help to academicians and MEA officials as well.

Maj. Gen. Ashok Kumar rejoiced, “The book is very close to his heart as it is his very first book.” He then mentioned instances when the Indian Army countered China successfully along the border after the 1962 debacle. He said that China faced humiliation at the hands of the Indian Army in the Nathu La in 1967 and the Sumdorong Chu standoff in 1986-87. Maj. Gen. Kumar said, “Our knowledge about China is very weak, be it among youth or defence officials. We can correct this only by adopting a whole of nation approach. In dealing with China, we need a 1971 war-like approach where we liberated East Pakistan in just 14 days and a new country was made.” He further added, “It is the character of China to backstab friends. An example of this is how China made Sri Lanka a victim of its debt-trap policy.”

Maj. Gen. Kumar while shedding light on China’s expansionist agenda noted that China has been troubling all its neighbours since 1947. It has captured Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and islands in the South China Sea. “China’s map used to be small in 1947 but now it has grown larger by occupying other nations and regions forcefully”, he articulated. On India and China, he said that it is not a territorial issue but a sovereignty issue. “The buffer zone policy is disadvantageous to India.” Maj. Gen. Kumar briefly elaborated on the various topics including Line of Actual Control (LAC), the Siachen dispute, the Kargil war, the Land Boundary Law which came into act in China in October 2021, CPEC, the South China issue, etc in the book.

Major Amit Bansal stated, “Every article in the book is a small book in itself. It is a comprehensive book and a must read for everyone.” He added, “China has border disputes with all its neighbours – like disputes with Russia over an island and Amur-Argun Rivers, Border dispute with Mongolia, North Korea over Tumen River and the list goes on because this is China’s nature. It is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) strategy to keep disputes open to backstab its friends as and when the right times come.” He then mentioned that China’s dispute with India is not just a territorial dispute, it is an economic dispute and a quest to become Asia’s sole superpower. “Each and every article of the book is a must-read to understand China’s ambitions and how its strategy with respect to India is working out,” he concluded.

Major Aparajita Pandey said, “The book will help policymakers, defence officials and academicians to better understand the India-China issue and deal with China more efficiently going forward.”“There is a long-standing struggle between China’s neighbours. China has territorial disputes with all its neighbours, along with maritime disputes with almost all countries – Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, etc,” affirmed Dr Vinay Kumar. He mentioned how China has reacted aggressively on almost every issue with India even when India has always shown a hand of cooperation and peace, for instance Panchsheel agreement and many more. He added that this book has covered a comprehensive Chinese foreign policy towards India and how to counter China’s territorial ambitions in the future.

Following the guest speaker’s address, there was an in-depth Q&A session. Maj. Mohd. Ali Shah, Former Army Officer and Motivational Speaker moderated the session. Ms Kritika Rajput, Research Associate at Red Lantern Analytica delivered the vote of Thanks. The session closed after the vote of thanks was given.

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