Untraditional SecurityOCTOBER 21, 2023

Indo-Chinese relationship and the third Trans Himalayan Forum

Team Red Lantern Analytica

Directorate of Intelligence

Introduction

The idea of a Trans Himalayan Forum first emerged in 2014 when then Chinese Ambassador to India, Wei Wei, proposed the concept to boost cooperation with India and promote a Trans Himalayan economic growth region. It received praise from prominent analysts like C Raja Mohan but wasn’t materialised as it kept India outside, reflecting growing differences in Indo-Chinese ties. As the third Trans Himalayan Forum was organised between 4-5 October, under the theme ‘Promoting the Harmony of Humans and Nature, Sharing the Fruits of Cooperation and Development,’ its location has become an issue in the Indo-China relationship.

Indo-China relationship: Overview

India and China have enjoyed a healthy relationship since 1988 when India’s PM Rajiv Gandhi visited China, which began a new era for the two Asian giants in their bilateral ties. Such a visit was viewed as a major event in the history of Asian relations, as it allowed them to take the path of economic growth and development in a healthy environment. The road to success of the India-China bilateral ties faced its first jolt following the Doklam incident in 2017. Later, a clash in the Galwan Valley in June 2020 formed a great wall which was earlier broken down following the 1988 visit with the intent to improve the India-China relationship. Considering the wide gap in military and economic strength and size between India and China, the Galwan Valley episode has become a watershed moment which has worsened the Indo-Chinese bilateral relationship.

Considering the Chinese developments in the Aksai Chin region and Southern Tibet – close to Arunachal Pradesh – India is promoting civil and military infrastructure to reduce and counter Chinese move along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). As such, moves have started to become visible, a concerning issue that is being watched closely globally. Meanwhile, India’s PM Narendra Modi and China’s President Xi Jinping have barely spoken in person since 2020. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s absence from the 2023 G20 Summit held in Delhi without giving any reason for his absence has raised eyebrows. On the other hand, India’s reservation about Chinese dominance in any multilateral group or bloc like the BRICS reflects a stalemate-like situation in the Indo-China relationship, and China is enjoying the upper hand. Thus, the scope of normalisation of the Indo-Chinese relationship remains low.

China, Arunachal Pradesh, the Trans Himalayan Forum, and its impact

China organised the first edition of the Trans Himalayan Forum, which was held in 2018 and saw Nepal, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Mongolia as attendees, on the other hand, India was never invited for the 2018 and 2019 editions. The Trans Himalayan forum was established with the objective of bolstering practical cooperation between countries in the region across multiple facets. It aimed to fortify cultural bonds encompassing ecological conservation, geographical connectivity, and environmental preservation. The third Trans Himalayan Forum took place in Nyingchi, a city in South Tibet, China, 160 km from Arunachal Pradesh, India, close to the disputed border, and has become a source of tension in the Indo-China relationship.

To understand the complexity around the location of the third Trans Himalayan Forum, there is a need to understand the issue of Arunachal Pradesh first. As China referred the Indian province as part of its territory and renamed it Xizang, and viewed it as a part of Tibet – call it Zagnan – and Arunachal Pradesh/ Xizang continues to be a bone of contention between India and China. As labelling and renaming are part of China’s strategy, and in 2021, it renamed 15 places in Arunachal Pradesh, issued a 2023 standard map showcasing the province as its part and also denied a visa to athletes from the province to attend the Hangzhou Asian Games 2023. Such moves pushed India to lodge a strong complaint with China; however, such developments have only complicated the Indo-Chinese relationship.

In such a situation, the location of the third Trans Himalayan Forum and a special invite to Pakistan along with Mongolia and Afghanistan has made the Indo-China convoluted. India continues to be missing from the forum despite its geographical location, reflecting China’s intent to keep India outside the forum. It ensures China’s reach and control in the Himalayan region are maintained to address its vested interest in the region. As the forum witnessed a tour to Tibet to counter the West’s narrative about the province, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi argued that nations must respect each other’s territorial sovereignty, and such a statement and development was directed towards India’s objection to the forum’s location. As Indo-Chinese ties are going through a strained phase, the conclusion of the forum supports India’s Foreign Minister Jaishankar’s’ view that the situation between India and China has been abnormal since the Galwan Valley incident.

Conclusion

As the world is facing challenges like clash of civilisation and on environmental fronts, China views the forum as a platform which embodies and promotes respect and cooperation among its members, which fits with China’s commitment towards development agenda. However, the nations it invited, the absence of India, highlights China wants to promote Chinese control and rule with like-minded nations. With the Qinghai-Xizang Plateau is essential for China to thrive and survive, China has used the forum to promote its objective and implement its geo-strategic policies to keep the humanitarian issue of Tibet hidden and secure the Chinese Communist Party’s rules in the country. As West argues, China is working hard to establish a rule-based international order that fits with its interests, and the Trans Himalayan Forum can be viewed as a piece of such a grand plan.

About the Author:

Kashif Anwar, is a Research Analyst at Global Strategic & Defence Analyses (GSDN), New Delhi, has an M.Phil in International Studies. His area of research interests is China, the US, India, geo-strategy, geo-economic, military technology, and geopolitical developments in the Indo-Pacific region. He has presented research papers at Jamia Millia Islamia and the Christ (Deemed to be University) Delhi NCR and published his papers in The Geopolitics, Modern Diplomacy, Financial Express, Policy Watcher, The Geostrata, The Defence Horizon Journal, Centre for Air Power Studies, EurOpinion, Global Strategic & Defence News and the Rise.

Related Intelligence

UNTRADITIONAL SECURITYOCTOBER 13, 2026

Why Calls to Revive SAARC Are About More Than Regional Cooperation

Why Calls to Revive SAARC Are About More Than Regional Cooperation Geopolitical positioning, institutional paralysis and the case for practical South Asian cooperation Rationale Founded in Dhaka in December 1985, SAARC brings together Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Its charter seeks to improve living standards, accelerate economic and social development, and strengthen collective self-reliance. Yet the organisation’s last summit was held in Kathmandu in November 2014. The 2016 Islamabad summit did not take place amid deteriorating India–Pakistan relations and the withdrawal of several participating states from the process. The result has been a prolonged institutional freeze, even as cross-border problems have become harder to manage in isolation. [1][2] The article notes call from Bangladesh and Maldives for SAARC to return to the negotiating table, alongside support for renewed regional engagement from Nepal and Bhutan. Bangladesh has also argued that SAARC and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) should work alongside one another rather than be treated as alternatives. Such statements matter, but a call for revival is not the same as an agreed roadmap, and neither necessarily indicates a willingness to resolve the political disputes that have paralysed the organisation. 1. The central obstacle is political, not merely administrative SAARC’s institutional design makes political goodwill indispensable. Article X of its charter requires decisions at every level to be unanimous and excludes bilateral and contentious issues from deliberations. The exclusion was intended to protect regional cooperation from being overwhelmed by disputes between neighbours. In practice, however, the combination of unanimity and deep bilateral mistrust has made it difficult to move forward when even one member is unwilling to participate. [1] This is the organisation’s central paradox: SAARC is designed to keep contentious disputes outside the room, but those disputes can determine whether the room is convened at all. India–Pakistan tensions have repeatedly obstructed summit-level engagement, while the deterioration of Pakistan–Afghanistan relations adds another layer of friction. The consequences are not confined to diplomacy. When leaders cannot meet, it becomes harder to secure political direction, approve ambitious initiatives and reassure officials that cross-border projects will survive the next crisis. Still, it would be too simple to attribute SAARC’s paralysis exclusively to one bilateral relationship. The consensus rule gives every member a veto, and weak implementation, limited institutional resources, uneven political commitment and low levels of regional economic interdependence have also constrained the organisation. A serious revival therefore requires more than a summit announcement. It requires a minimum political understanding that technical cooperation should continue even when high-level relations are strained. 2. Regionalism is also a tool of geopolitical balancing Smaller South Asian states do not make foreign-policy choices in a vacuum. They seek investment, infrastructure, security partnerships, market access and diplomatic support from multiple partners. China’s economic presence, the continuing importance of the United States, ties with Gulf countries and links with Southeast Asia all shape the choices available to governments across the region. Building such relationships is not, by itself, evidence of disloyalty to South Asian cooperation. It is a normal form of strategic diversification. The geopolitical question is how governments use these relationships. A renewed appeal to SAARC can help a state demonstrate that it wants a voice in regional affairs, avoid being seen as dependent on a single partner, or signal dissatisfaction with the limits of existing bilateral arrangements. It may also be a way of reminding India, the region’s largest economy and most geographically central state, that neighbouring countries value multilateral forums in which they can participate on a more formally equal footing. Bangladesh’s and Maldives’ efforts to deepen relationships beyond India illustrate the wider strategic setting described in the original draft. Chinese-backed infrastructure, potential security partnerships and engagement with Gulf states can expand policy options for these governments. But the inference must be handled carefully: external partnerships do not prove that calls for SAARC are insincere. A more defensible conclusion is that regional cooperation and geopolitical hedging can occur simultaneously. The real test is whether governments are prepared to translate their rhetoric into funded programmes, negotiated rules and sustained participation. For India, this creates a strategic dilemma. It may be reluctant to invest political capital in a forum where progress can be blocked and bilateral disputes may dominate the agenda. At the same time, prolonged disengagement can leave neighbouring states with fewer region-wide channels and make alternative groupings or external partners more attractive. A regional institution that is unable to deliver results can weaken India’s influence; an institution that works predictably could instead reinforce India’s role as a provider of regional public goods. 3. The economic case for cooperation remains compelling The weakness of SAARC is particularly striking when measured against the economic opportunities available to South Asia. The World Bank reports that intra-regional trade accounts for only about 5 per cent of South Asia’s total trade, compared with roughly 25 per cent in ASEAN. It estimates current trade among South Asian economies at around US$23 billion, well below an estimated potential of at least US$67 billion. High tariffs, non-tariff barriers, restrictions on investment, poor transport links and a persistent trust deficit all contribute to this gap. [3] These figures suggest that the region’s problem is not a lack of economic logic. It is the failure to convert geographical proximity into lower costs and dependable connections. Businesses can face more expensive and complicated trade with nearby countries than with distant markets. For landlocked Nepal and Bhutan, access to ports and efficient transit routes is especially important. For Bangladesh, improved links with India, Nepal and Bhutan can widen markets and make ports and transport corridors more productive. For India’s border states, regional commerce can support local firms, jobs and supply chains. The South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA), which came into force in 2006, has not delivered the depth of integration originally anticipated. A tariff agreement alone cannot overcome closed or inefficient border crossings, inconsistent standards, weak logistics, payment constraints and political restrictions. Nor can regional

AdminAnalyst

arrow_outward

UNTRADITIONAL SECURITYAUGUST 14, 2026

Myanmar at a Crossroad: Mapping Political Evolution & Future Pathways

Myanmar at a Crossroad: Mapping Political Evolution & Future Pathways Red Lantern Analytica presents a new research report, “Myanmar at a Crossroad: Mapping Political Evolution & Future Pathways,” authored by Lt Col Ujjwal Abhishek Jha, Retd. The report traces Myanmar’s political evolution from independence in 1948, examining the country’s transition from an early parliamentary democracy to prolonged military rule and the recurring cycles of political upheaval and resistance. It explores the historical foundations of Myanmar’s political fragility, the legacy of colonial rule, the country’s post-independence trajectory, and the major turning points that have shaped its contemporary political landscape. The analysis seeks to map Myanmar’s present political crossroads and examine the possible pathways shaping its future, offering a structured perspective on the forces influencing the country’s political evolution. To Download PDF of this report click here

AdminAnalyst

arrow_outward

UNTRADITIONAL SECURITYAUGUST 12, 2026

Europe Without Russian Energy

How far has Europe actually moved away from Russian energy? In this report, Aadvik Chauhan examines the EU’s transition from political commitments to legally binding restrictions on Russian gas imports, while assessing the continuing role of Russian energy in Europe’s supply structure. The analysis explores energy security, divergent positions among EU member states, infrastructure constraints, renewable energy growth, and the strategic implications of Europe’s attempt to reduce dependence on Russia. The report also examines the paradox of rising Russian gas imports during the early stages of the 2026 phase-out and considers why 2027 could prove decisive for assessing the depth of Europe’s energy transition. To Download PDF of this report click here

AdminAnalyst

arrow_outward