INTELLIGENCE ARCHIVE

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12 published analyses, newest first.

Mapping the Geopolitical Fallout of the Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF), Myanmar
REPORTJULY 2, 2026
01

Mapping the Geopolitical Fallout of the Steering Council for the Emergence of a Federal Democratic Union (SCEF), Myanmar

As Myanmar’s conflict enters a new phase, the formation of the SCEF marks an important development in the country’s resistance movement and federal aspirations. Authored by Lt. Col. Ujjual Abishek Jha (Retd.), DCCP, this report examines the origins of SCEF, its political and military objectives, stakeholder dynamics, strengths and challenges, and the strategic implications for India and the wider Indo-Pacific. To Download PDF of this report click here

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Recalibrating the Indo–Myanmar Border: Strategic Imperatives under India’s Act East Policy
REPORTMARCH 17, 2026
02

Recalibrating the Indo–Myanmar Border: Strategic Imperatives under India’s Act East Policy

This report presents a comprehensive analysis of the evolving dynamics along the India–Myanmar land border, with a particular focus on its strategic relevance under India’s Act East Policy. It examines the intersection of security concerns, connectivity initiatives, and geopolitical competition shaping the region today. Drawing on current developments, the report highlights key challenges including insurgency, transnational crime, and humanitarian concerns, while also assessing the implications of political instability in Myanmar. It further explores the growing importance of cross-border infrastructure projects such as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project and the India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway in enhancing regional integration. Importantly, the report situates the India–Myanmar border within a broader geopolitical context, including the expanding role of external actors and the need for a calibrated and forward-looking policy approach. It emphasizes the balance between strengthening border security and preserving the socio-cultural fabric of border communities. To Download beautifully formatted PDF of this report click here.

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Bengal Florican and the Siang Grasslands
REPORTFEBRUARY 10, 2026
03

Bengal Florican and the Siang Grasslands

Why Arunachal Pradesh and Pasighat Matter: The Bengal Florican (Houbaropsis bengalensis) is the rarest bustard on Earth and one of the most evolutionarily distinctive birds anywhere. It belongs to a single-species genus, which makes its branch on the tree of life unusually isolated: if it disappears, there is nothing quite like it to take its place. Globally the species is classified as Critically Endangered, with a total population likely under a thousand mature individuals, split between South Asia and Cambodia (with a faint historical footprint in Vietnam and Bangladesh). The steep decline is driven by the loss and degradation of seasonally flooded grasslands, woody encroachment when fire and grazing patterns change, disturbance in the breeding season, and (in parts of its range) hunting and snaring. (BirdLife DataZone, EDGE of Existence) This report explains—in plain language but with research depth—why Arunachal Pradesh, especially the grassland archipelago around Pasighat and Daying (D’Ering) Ering Memorial Wildlife Sanctuary, is vital to the Florican’s survival, what we know about its ecology and movements in the Siang floodplain, what’s threatening the bird and its habitat, and how conserving it is inseparable from conserving the ecology, culture, and identity of Northeast India’s riverine grasslands. Rather than a “project plan,” what follows is a reader’s guide to the species and landscape: the big picture, the local picture, and the cultural picture—stitched together with the best available sources. Meet the bird: a specialist of floodplain grasslands: If you stood on a Pasighat river island (a chapori) in late spring, just as the monsoon hints at arriving, you might—if lucky—see a male Bengal Florican lift vertically above the grass with a sudden flutter, black-and-white wings flashing, crest upright, and then drop back into invisibility. That display, repeated at intervals, is how males advertise territories. Everything about the species is tied to grass structure and seasonality. It needs: ●Open sightlines for males to display (short-to-medium sward height in patches). ●Dense, concealing tussocks for females to nest and brood. ●Invertebrate-rich foraging among lightly disturbed swards and damp edges. ●A natural flood pulse that periodically resets woody growth and creates a shifting mosaic of islands and grass stands. Across its range, the Florican is not a long-distance migrant like geese or cranes. Instead, it makes short, seasonal movements—often a few to a few dozen kilometers—tracking flooding and grass height. In the Brahmaputra–Terai system and around Cambodia’s Tonlé Sap, birds occupy open breeding grounds in the dry season and then retreat to safer cover as monsoon waters rise; some individuals in Nepal have been tracked moving up to ~30 km, even slipping across international borders for seasonal refuge. For Pasighat, that means the bird’s year is lived within a network of chapori grasslands, not a single site. Protect the network, and you protect the bird. (Mongabay, Charles Sturt University Research Output) Why Pasighat–Siang is a cornerstone: Daying (D’Ering) Ering Memorial Wildlife Sanctuary lies just 13–25 km from Pasighat, spread over roughly 190 km² of river-created islands between the Siang (the Upper Brahmaputra) and the Sibya. About 80% of the sanctuary is grassland, with the remainder riverine and secondary forest—textbook Florican country when managed with seasonal sensitivity. BirdLife International recognizes D’Ering as an Important Bird Area (IBA) precisely for floodplain specialists, including the Florican and the endemic Swamp Grass Babbler. The sanctuary’s chaporis, remade each year by erosion and deposition, deliver the habitat heterogeneity—short swards here, taller stands there—that the species’ breeding and brood-rearing require. (BirdLife DataZone, Roundglass Sustain, Wikipedia) Yet the very dynamism that sustains these grasslands is now tilted against them. New analyses and reportage indicate that D’Ering lost ~55.9 km² of grasslands between 2012 and 2022— a massive contraction in one decade—driven by altered flood regimes, riverbank erosion,siltation patterns, and a suite of human pressures (from unseasonal burning and cutting to encroachment). For a bird that lives by the square kilometer of suitable sward, that loss is existential. (Mongabay-India) The threats explained: It’s easy to assume “grass grows back.” Floodplain grasslands, however, are not lawns. They are intricate systems shaped by water timing, sediment, fire, and grazing. Damage the rhythm, and the system flips. ●Hydrology out of tune. Flood pulses that linger too long scour and drown islands; pulses that arrive too erratically let woody plants take over. Either way, you lose the patchy openness males need for display and females need for safe nesting. The Siang’s recent patterns—erosion in one set of chaporis, silt burial in another—show up vividly in remote-sensing assessments and in ground reports from D’Ering. (ResearchGate) ●Ill-timed fire and cutting. Fire and mowing are not inherently bad. In fact, well-timed, light burns before breeding can restore open display arenas, and post-breeding rotational cutting can prevent shrubs from taking over. But late fires (March–August) cook nests and expose chicks; blanket cutting destroys heterogeneity. Nepal’s 2024– 2033 Florican plan and case studies from Cambodia lean heavily on seasonal grass management for this reason. (National Parks and Wildlife, Mongabay) ●Invasive and woody encroachment. Where fire is suppressed and grazing changes, woody clumps and exotics can fill in. The result is a “too-tall, too-dense” structure— bad for display, awkward for ground-nesting birds, and risky in monsoon. (This is a general grassland phenomenon, but it has particular bite for Floricans.) (Roundglass Sustain) ●Disturbance and hunting. In parts of Southeast Asia, hunting has been devastating. In the Indian and Nepali context, disturbance during the breeding season—including dog predation on ground nests—can be a big, invisible killer. Even occasional hunting pressure magnifies risk when a population is tiny to begin with. (Mongabay) ●Land conversion at the margins. Floodplains worldwide are magnets for agriculture. Where chaporis stabilize, they are tempting to convert; where they stay dynamic, they’re hard to govern. A sanctuary boundary helps, but a bird that moves seasonally among multiple islands needs friendly practices outside the boundary as well. (BirdLife DataZone)

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Team Red Lantern AnalyticaAnalyst
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REPORTMAY 31, 2025
04

India Defence Industry Report by RLA

India Defence Industry Report by RLA Click on the above link to Download the Report in Pdf to read in full.

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Team Red Lantern AnalyticaAnalyst
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Silicon Battleground Report by Red Lantern Analytica
REPORTMARCH 22, 2025
05

Silicon Battleground Report by Red Lantern Analytica

Download Pdf Copy of the Report by clicking on the link below: Silicon Battleground Report by Red Lantern Analytica Download Pdf Copy of the Report by clicking on the link below: Silicon Battleground Report by Red Lantern Analytica

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Team Red Lantern AnalyticaAnalyst
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REPORTAUGUST 20, 2024
06

China’s Economic Espionage around the world

Chinese economic espionage is only one aspect of China’s larger strategic endeavour to obtain the technological expertise required to support its economic expansion and disrupt the present geopolitical order. Over the past few years, there have been many cases of Chinese economic espionage around the world, especially in intellectual property (IP) theft, trade secrets, military technologies and cyber espionage. This is not only done by businesses and individuals but is mostly sponsored by the State authorities. China’s efforts not only provide support to its local industry and improve its economic competitiveness, but they also enable China to demonstrate its influence on the global stage. The Chinese government employs various tactics, including leveraging businesses, institutions, and individuals, to obtain proprietary information from around the globe, especially in the United States and Europe. These methods range from acquiring companies with valuable intellectual property to coercing joint ventures with Chinese firms, to outright theft and cyberattacks. While cyberattacks can be challenging to link directly to the Chinese government, digital footprints have been traced back to hacker groups with ties to Beijing. Additionally, China exploits its diaspora in the West, particularly Chinese students, faculty, and employees, by recruiting spies and emphasizing allegiance to China regardless of nationality. This approach blurs the line between loyalty to one’s homeland and sharing sensitive information. In recent years, China has been recruiting those it considers expat nationals through “thousand talents” programs, which identify experts in American schools and industries to help fill specific gaps in knowledge back home. Numerous instances over the past decade involve individuals associated with Chinese entities attempting to steal trade secrets across various industries, from agriculture to high-tech products like locomotives and semiconductors. Such cases underscore China’s ongoing efforts to acquire proprietary information from the United States and other Western countries. On the other hand, domestically China has detained foreign businesspeople on espionage charges, citing National security reasons. Foreign companies operating in China have complained about unclear laws on corporate espionage.

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The U.S. Actions and Diplomacy against the Brewing Tensions between the U.S. and the PRC
REPORTAUGUST 17, 2024
07

The U.S. Actions and Diplomacy against the Brewing Tensions between the U.S. and the PRC

The relationship between the U.S. and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been characterized by tensions primarily revolving around trade, technology, and human rights. The U.S. implemented tariffs on Chinese imports and placed restrictions on certain technologies, aiming to address perceived unfair trade practices and cybersecurity threats. Criticisms of PRC’s human rights record, particularly concerning Xinjiang and Hong Kong, resulted in the imposition of sanctions and diplomatic pressures. Furthermore, the U.S. heightened its military presence in the Indo-Pacific region as a strategic response to the PRC’s assertiveness in the South China Sea. Despite these challenges, diplomatic engagements persisted, and efforts were underway to strengthen alliances in the region. The dynamic nature of this relationship requires continuous monitoring of the latest developments. Many events happened in 2023 that we analyze here. The U.S. – Taiwan relations and the Indo-Pacific region In April, the U.S. and Taiwan decided to resume in-person discussions on co-producing weapons which sparked tensions with the PRC. In response, PRC warned that weapon production in Taiwan could escalate tensions. The focus of the Taiwan-U.S. Defense Industry Forum is on integrating Taiwan’s industrial capabilities, defence cooperation, and co-production possibilities. On 11 April, Taiwan and the U.S. signed two deals worth nearly $420 million for the maintenance of fighter aircraft operated by Taiwan. The agreements involved a $323 million parts contract running through March 2028 and a smaller deal covering nonstandard parts and aviation materials through June 2027. These agreements reflected Taiwan’s reliance on the U.S. for air defence amid increasing military pressure from the PRC. Later in September, during a visit to Taiwan, the U.S. congressional delegation stated that the U.S. would respond resolutely if Taiwan was attacked and pledged to address the $19 billion backlog in Taiwan’s defence purchases from the U.S. which was the first-ever U.S. military transfer to Taiwan under a program usually reserved for assistance to sovereign, independent states. However, the U.S. law requires Washington to provide Taiwan with the means to defend itself, treating any threats as matters of grave concern, but it remains ambiguous on whether the U.S. would commit forces in response to an attack. Earlier in July, the U.S. had approved $345 million in military aid for Taiwan. Then in October, the U.S. expressed skepticism about PRC’s willingness to launch a blockade of Taiwan in any attempt to take the island by force. Ely Ratner, the Defense Department’s assistant secretary for Indo-Pacific security affairs, highlighted the potential high cost and risk for Beijing in such an action. He also emphasized the global economic consequences and suggested that it could rally the international community against PRC. In December, the U.S. and Taiwan were exploring ways to expand Taiwan’s participation in the United Nations system and other international forums. Both countries had held routine consultations, emphasizing the importance of working closely with like-minded partners who share concerns about excluding Taiwan from the international community. This came after the PRC objected to including Taiwan in the United Nations climate talks. Discussions between the U.S. and Taiwan focused on opportunities for Taiwan’s participation in the World Health Assembly, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and other multilateral organizations. In the Indo-Pacific region, the U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Tonga, New Zealand, and Australia, to demonstrate the Biden administration’s commitment to the Indo-Pacific region amid concerns about PRC’s growing influence. The U.S. opened an embassy in Tonga. This expansion aimed to enhance the U.S. presence and influence to maintain stability and counterbalance PRC’s growing activities. In August, the U.S., South Korea, and Japan established a tripartite security regime during their trilateral summit at Camp David. The summit was anticipated to strengthen security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, addressing concerns related to North Korean threats and PRC’s strategic challenges. The move was part of the U.S. strategy to consolidate regional alliances to counterbalance PRC’s influence. The trilateral collaboration would focus on intelligence sharing, missile defence, joint military exercises, cybersecurity, early warning cooperation, and enhanced nuclear deterrence.

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REPORTAUGUST 17, 2024
08

China Digest (January 2024)

To safeguard our national security, it is crucial to stay informed about the domestic and geopolitical events happening in and around China. Here is a news digest summarizing key developments in China for January. Chinese Economy: According to reports, China’s economic growth rate in 2023 marked one of the lowest levels in decades, highlighting the significant impact of a property-sector collapse and weaker consumer confidence despite the lifting of all COVID-19 restrictions.[1] In an odd turn of events, several prominent commentaries by economists and journalists in China have disappeared from the internet in recent weeks. This development has sparked concerns that Beijing is intensifying its censorship efforts as it endeavours to portray a positive image amid economic challenges.[2] China’s indebted real estate developer Evergrande was forced into liquidation by a Hong Kong court after they were unable to provide a feasible restructuring plan. The ruling comes amid ongoing financial woes and an investigation into its founder. Due to concerns about the company’s potential effects on the industry and China’s economy, trading in Evergrande’s shares was halted.[3] US-China Dynamics: Chinese-made drones pose a national security threat to the US due to laws compelling companies to provide access to user data to Chinese authorities, according to a memo by the FBI and CISA. This risk includes potential exposure of vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure and intellectual property to Chinese intelligence services, as well as the possibility of cyber-attacks. The memo advises against using Chinese drones and suggests secure alternatives from US manufacturers. Congressional actions, including bans on the procurement of Chinese drones by federal agencies, highlight concerns over Chinese drone usage. Lawmakers advocate for a complete ban on Chinese drones to protect US interests.[4] There were reports that a Dutch manufacturer, ASML, a key player in the semiconductor manufacturing supply chain, had reportedly cancelled shipments of hi-tech microchip machinery to China following pressure from the US government. The Dutch government revoked the licenses that prevented the shipment of three chip-making machines to China. The cancellation of the shipments comes amidst US efforts to limit China’s semiconductor capabilities. This move follows previous restrictions placed on ASML’s deep ultraviolet (DUV) lithography machines last year under pressure from the US government.[5] Threat over Taiwan: According to reports, high-altitude balloons believed to be from China resurfaced over Taiwan, reminiscent of a previous incident that strained US-China relations. The timing was critical as it happened when Taiwan was going for the presidential election which has the potential to impact U.S.-China dynamics.[6] Elsewhere, an error caused panic in the public in Taiwan. A satellite launch in China triggered an emergency alert in Taiwan, days before its presidential election, causing alarm and confusion due to an erroneous English translation. The bilingual air raid alert, sent to every mobile phone, inaccurately translated ‘satellite’ to ‘missile’. The message warned of a missile flyover in Taiwan airspace. The alert was later clarified, and Taiwan’s defence ministry apologized for the oversight in the English translation.[7] According to reports, China is employing a diplomatic offensive in response to the election of Lai Ching-te as the next president of Taiwan. The campaign may involve propaganda, threats, and infiltration to bring the island under Chinese control without a military invasion. Despite tensions, military confrontation is not imminent, with China prioritizing its relations with the US and internal military reforms. Experts expect China to intensify pressure on Taiwan, including economic and trade sanctions and cognitive warfare, to influence the island’s politics and policies.[8] South China Sea Conflict: Vietnam and the Philippines signed two memoranda of understanding (MOUs) on cooperation in the South China Sea (SCS). The MOUs covered incident prevention and management in the SCS, as well as maritime cooperation. The agreements aim to enhance coordination on maritime issues bilaterally, within ASEAN, and with other dialogue partners. The MOU on maritime cooperation seeks to strengthen understanding, mutual trust, and confidence through the development of a Joint Coast Guard Committee and a hotline communications mechanism. Analysts view the agreements as a step towards breaking China’s dominance peacefully, although there are potential risks of conflict if China perceives its interests are being undermined.[9] A Chinese coast guard ship, known as ‘The Monster’ for its size, has been patrolling near Vietnam’s oil exploration blocks at Vanguard Bank in the South China Sea since early December, raising concerns about territorial tensions. The ship has been conducting an ‘intrusive patrol’ in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), where Vietnam has oil exploration projects. The ship has been operating with its AIS (Automatic Information System) turned off, violating international maritime safety conventions. The situation adds to longstanding tensions in the South China Sea, with Vanguard Bank being a known flashpoint between Vietnam and China.[10]

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REPORTAUGUST 17, 2024
09

Chinese Dubious Economic Activities around the Globe

Economic measures have been used as a tactic to exert influence over policies and politics since early times. In the present world, economic activities are wielded as weapons through sanctions, tariffs, debt diplomacy, protectionist approaches, etc. These are employed to gain geopolitical interests, manipulate policies and trade and shape contemporary global dynamics. One country that is infamous for employing unfair trade practices is China. Through unfair trade measures like dumping and intellectual property theft, market access limitations, and debt diplomacy, China uses economic measures as weapons. It gains economic advantages through the use of subsidies and state-owned firms. It also uses investments to exercise influence, inciting geopolitical crises and upending international conventions. China’s such practices have raised concerns among many economic hubs like the European Union (EU), Indo-Pacific, Africa, United States (US), etc. China has 60 per cent of global manufacturing capacity, 31 per cent of global production and 14 per cent of global consumption. Its extensive manufacturing surplus capacity, which is fueled by significant state expenditure and subsidies, is escalating tensions between its state-led economic model and Western market-oriented capitalism. Foreign governments, particularly those in the EU, are urging China to relax its industrial restrictions and focus more on its domestic market. However, China’s ambitious ‘Made in China 2025’ strategy seeks to dominate vital industries worldwide, exacerbating trade tensions.[1] Here, we look at recent reports on China’s dubious economic activity over the last few months. In Europe The European Union has announced proposals to bolster the bloc’s economic security, including safeguards to prevent critical technology from straying into the hands of geopolitical adversaries such as China.[2] According to news reports in early December 2023, European countries, especially Germany and France, have taken steps to scrutinize and restrict Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), affecting the technology and infrastructure industries. Germany is planning to tighten investment screening procedures to prevent Chinese companies from accessing industries deemed critical to national security. This decision comes amid concerns expressed about China’s growing influence in Germany. The drop in Chinese FDI in Europe in 2022, along with an increase in greenfield investments in industries such as electric vehicles, indicates the shifting landscape for Chinese businesses in the region.[3] Moreover, on 6 December 2023, China rejected the European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s criticism of the EU’s trade deficit with China, claiming that export limitations to China are partially to blame for the imbalance. Wang Wenbin, a spokesman for the foreign ministry, said that the EU shouldn’t be restricting high-tech exports when it hopes to boost exports to China.[4] On the other hand, the European solar manufacturing industry is facing significant challenges due to increased competition from Chinese manufacturers. The rush to adopt solar power in Europe has led to a surge in demand for solar panels, but the majority of these panels are being supplied by Chinese companies that benefit from government subsidies. This has resulted in a decline in European solar manufacturing firms, as they struggle to compete on cost.[5] In late January 2024, there were reports that Meyer Burger, a Swiss solar panel manufacturer was suffering against Chinese competition and warned that without government backing, its German production unit could close. Gunter Erfurt, the CEO, accused Chinese manufacturers of deliberately lowering costs through targeted subsidies. This situation highlights Chinese overcapacity flooding the EU market resulting in trade disputes.[6] In Indo-Pacific According to reports in early February, the US deployed three aircraft carriers to the western Pacific to step up measures to deter China and North Korea. This decision, despite the concerns in West Asia, demonstrates the commitment to the Indo-Pacific. The US Navy and Japan conducted joint training exercises in the Philippine Sea, involving the USS Carl Vinson, USS Theodore Roosevelt, and Japanese helicopter destroyer JS Ise. The deployment is the first time in two years that three US carriers have come near the first island chain. The deployment aims to strengthen deterrence and reassure allies amid regional concerns, notably around Taiwan and North Korea. Moreover, the US continues to prioritize trilateral collaboration with Japan and South Korea for addressing regional security problems.[7] Furthermore, the US has announced that it will resume its Peace Corps program in Palau in 2025. The move is in line with recent efforts to enhance cooperation and engagement with Pacific island nations to counter growing Chinese influence in the region.[8] Additionally, Richard Verma, the Deputy Secretary of State for the US, warned Papua New Guinea (PNG) that any security assurance with Beijing has costs and repercussions and advised PNG to decline China’s offer of a possible security pact. This came in response to an earlier announcement from PNG’s Foreign Minister, Justin Tkachenko, that PNG is in early discussions with China regarding a security deal, which includes assistance in police force training, equipment, and surveillance technology. The US and Australia view the Pacific as their sphere of influence and are working to discourage Pacific island nations from forming security ties with China, especially after China signed a security pact with the Solomon Islands in 2022.[9]

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Team Red Lantern AnalyticaAnalyst
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REPORTAUGUST 17, 2024
10

Broken Promises of China to the World

“Broken promises fracture the foundation of trust, leaving behind shards of disappointment that echo through the corridors of relationships and international affairs.” The idea of trust is fundamental to the field of international relations and is essential to promoting global cooperation. Trust is simply the reliance and faith placed in another person, the trustee, with the expectation that one’s interests would be protected, even in the face of possible exploitation. It acts as the cornerstone of diplomatic ties and alliances, affecting the dynamics of cooperation on the international stage.[1] To manage the complexity of geopolitical interactions, the delicate interplay of international affairs primarily relies on building and preserving trust. However, despite its importance in international relations, there are evident cases where promises made were not kept, violating this founding principle. The fragility of trust becomes apparent when certain countries choose to break the expectations and faith put in them for a variety of reasons. In recent times the synonym for such instances has been The People’s Republic of China (PRC). Many countries, time and again, have expressed their concerns about PRC’s actions and policies in geopolitics which has created an impression that it doesn’t uphold the norms and values of trust and promises in the international system. These concerns include a variety of areas like Human Rights challenges, commercial practices, territorial disputes and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). When the PRC joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001, the international rules-based system substantially helped the Chinese economy, but the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) continued disapproval of the notion that the rule of law should take precedence over the Party’s role in governing the state has made it impossible for the PRC to follow through on its WTO obligations and make the transition to a market economy. Hence, even after almost two decades, it has not fulfilled many of the trade-liberalizing promises it made to persuade countries to accept its membership.[2] Contrary to benefiting from the international rules-based system, PRC’s economic and trade policies are increasingly at odds with fundamental principles of global trade. Key principles such as national treatment, non-discrimination, and adherence to rules-governed, market-based trade, as outlined in the theory of comparative advantage, have faced challenges due to the PRC’s evolving economic strategies. Rather than aligning with these global trade principles, the PRC has embraced what is termed ‘innovation mercantilism’.[3] The PRC is enacting laws that actually impede free and fair competition. These consist of actions like intimidating technology transfer, manufacturing and export subsidies, and even currency manipulation. Such measures are intended to provide domestic businesses an advantage over their overseas rivals. Rather than waning, these methods have been stronger recently as the PRC actively pursues absolute advantages in many high-tech areas. PRC’s persistent disregard for WTO standards presents a significant risk to the international innovation framework.[4] The PRC poses a threat to the fundamental basis of the international trade system as long as it persists in pursuing policies that put national benefit ahead of conformity to international standards. To join WTO, the PRC had to agree on the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which provides protections for patents, copyrights, trademarks, service marks, industrial designs, digital content, and other intangible property.[5] However, the PRC companies have many times been accused of stealing IPR from US companies and most of these complaints stressed that the CCP directs these thefts.[6] In October 2023, the intelligence chiefs of Five Eyes also warned about the theft of IPR related to technology, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and other trade secrets. The theft is not limited to government and military secrets but extends to critical infrastructure, academic research at universities, and startup companies.[7] According to a CNBC report in 2019, one in five North American-based corporations on the CNBC Global CFO Council says the PRC companies have stolen their intellectual property in 2018 only.[8]

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REPORTAUGUST 17, 2024
11

Chinese Naval Drills

China’s Naval activities in the South China Sea (SCS) and the Indian Ocean have raised concerns in the region. China has been conducting naval drills, including setting up navigation restriction zones in disputed SCS. These drills are not limited to Southeast Asian Waters, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has increased its activities in the Indian Ocean with the intention to dominate the regional geopolitics. In September 2023, according to leaked US Navy intelligence, China’s shipbuilding capacity vastly surpasses that of the United States, with a capacity 232 times greater. The leaked briefing slide, titled ‘PLAN vs. USN Naval Force Laydown’, indicated that China’s shipyards can handle over 23.2 million tons, compared to the US capacity of less than 100,000 tons. This becomes a concern as China has been increasing its naval footprint throughout the world, focusing on securing access to ports and terminals and setting up bases abroad. China operates commercial ports in many countries like Gabon and Equatorial Guinea and has a naval base in Djibouti which poses a potential threat in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). And now China is looking to increase its presence through a naval base on the Western African coast towards the Atlantic Ocean. This revelation underscores China’s rapid expansion in naval capabilities, with projections suggesting a fleet of 440 ships by 2030. Such activities of China have implications for the regional stability and security. Here, we try to analyze a few of such activities and events that made news in the past few months.1. Increasing Domestic Capabilities• Chinese President Xi Jinping appointed Adm. Dong Jun as China’s defence minister, marking the first time a naval officer assumed this role. Dong’s extensive experience, including leadership roles in the PLAN and operational assignments in the Chinese military’s Eastern and Southern theatre commands, provides him with an unprecedented background that underscores Xi’s priorities, with Taiwan being of utmost importance.• China’s PLAN hosted the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) Workshop 2024 in Nanjing, on 16 January, focusing on the revision and updating of documents including the WPNS Business Charter, the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea and the Disaster Response Guide, as well as future WPNS activities. Delegates from 23 WPNS member states including China, Australia, Canada, Chile, France, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Russia

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REPORTAUGUST 17, 2024
12

RLA Report on Ongoing Myanmar Civil War: Implications for India and China

Prepared by:Lakshmi Kusuma KothaAngel ChindaliaAnkansha PalHarini T RKhushboo Zaveri Table of Contents1. Introduction2. Rebel Factions & their Operations3. The PRC’s Involvement And Investments4. PRC’s Influence in Myanmar Affecting Indian Interests5. India’s Strategic Options6. Conclusion Abbreviations:1. PRC: People’s Republic of China2. NLD: National League for Democracy3. AA: Arakan Army4. USDP: Union Solidarity & Development Party5. NUG: National Unity Government6. PDF: People’s Defence Force7. PaKhaPha/PDT: People’s Defense Teams8. TNLA: Ta’ang National Liberation Army9. MNDAA: Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army10. KIA: Kachin Independence Army11. UWSA: United Wa State Army12. CAN: Chin National Army13. CNF: Chin National Front14. CDF: Chinland Defence Force15. KNPP: Karenni National Progressive Party16. KPDF: Karenni People’s Defence Force17. KNDF: Karenni National Defence Force18. BRI: Belt and Road Initiative19. EAO: Ethnic Armed Organisation20. ULFA: United Liberation Front of Asom21. NSCN: National Socialist Council of Nagaland22. PLA-M: People’s Liberation Army of Manipur23. ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations24. NSCN-K: National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Khaplang List of Figures:Fig. 1: Chinese undertaken projects in MyanmarFig. 2: Current Situation of civil unrest in MyanmarFig. 3: Events per month from March 2021 to April 2024 List of TablesTable 1: Projects undertaken by India in Myanmar 1. INTRODUCTION Myanmar is bordered by India to the Northwest, Tibet (occupied by the People’s Republic of China) in the north and the PRC in the northeast, Laos to the east, Thailand to the Southeast, and the Bay of Bengal to the South and Bangladesh to the West. It shares land borders with five key Asian countries making it a significant player in Asian regional geopolitics especially in Southeast Asia. It also has access to vital maritime trade routes, which makes its location interesting for global geo-economics. This advantageous position has the potential to influence regional trade dynamics and international economic strategies. Since gaining independence from British colonial rule in 1948, Myanmar has faced substantial political and economic challenges. The country experienced extended periods of instability, marked by military coups and authoritarian rule, which have hindered its development. This turbulence is particularly evident in the ongoing civil war, which has caused significant human suffering and disrupted progress.Demographically, the majority of the people in Myanmar speak Burmese and are known for diverse ethnicities in the region. Officially there are 135 ethnic groups in Myanmar, the major seven groups are the Arakan, Chin, Kachin, Karen (Kayin), Karenni (Kayah), Mon and Shan. The majority group is called the Bamars, while the others are the minority groups. Notably, over time, the objectives of these ethnic groups have also evolved from being an independent state to self-government, limited autonomy, equal rights, fair distribution of the state’s natural resource income, peace and growth of their state, preservation of their language, culture and religion, among other aspects. Myanmar has experienced various ethnic tensions since its independence. The Rohingya Crisis and the fight between the Arakan Army (AA) and the Tatmadaw (military of Myanmar) have dominated the last few decades of internal conflict in Myanmar, with the focus being on the Rakhine State. But the worldwide focus on the “ethnic cleansing” and forced relocation of the Rohingya has overtaken the latter. These diverse ethnic groups have a long-standing troubled history with the military junta of Myanmar.Considering its strategic location in Southeast Asia, Myanmar is vulnerable to greater international political dynamics. Myanmar’s relevance in the region is further crucial for its rich oil, gas and mineral resources. In recent years, it has invested and tapped on the cross-

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