China’s Deceptive Playbook on Pledges and Provocations
Asia

China’s Deceptive Playbook on Pledges and Provocations

TR

Team Red Lantern Analytica

Directorate of Intelligence

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In international diplomacy, consistency and good faith are the bedrock of trust. Only few powers have drawn as much scrutiny and criticism as the People’s Republic of China for its actions in disputed maritime and territorial zones. Boasting rapid economic growth, expanding military reach, and a growing appetite for regional leadership, Beijing has positioned itself as a global power. Beneath the veneer of “peaceful rise” rhetoric lies a consistent pattern of diplomatic duplicity: agreements signed in ink that are later eroded by deployments, infrastructure projects, and legal dismissals. A pattern has emerged over the past two decades in which China systematically disregards international judgments, bilateral agreements, and multilateral frameworks, asserting dominance through coercion, strategic infrastructure build-up, and selective adherence to legal norms. China has exhibited a pattern of calculated duplicity using diplomacy to stall while militarizing on the ground. This article examines major incidents where China promised peace but pursued power, unpacking the motivations, fallout, and wider geopolitical implications.

1. The Scarborough Shoal Standoff (2012)
In mid-2012, the Philippine Coast Guard and Chinese maritime surveillance vessels became locked in a standoff at Scarborough Shoal, a traditional fishing ground well within Manila’s internationally recognized Exclusive Economic Zone. Initially, both parties agreed—even under U.S. auspices—to withdraw and negotiate under the umbrella of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). But when Philippine boats pulled back, China seized the initiative: coast guard cutters moved in, establishing a blockade that prevented Filipino fishermen from returning.

This maneuvers epitomized a “two-step” approach: publicly pledge cooperation, then exploit any opening to cement control. By cloaking its actions in diplomatic engagement, Beijing avoided international sanctions or direct military confrontation. In the weeks that followed, reports surfaced of Chinese vessels physically barring Filipino boats and harassing crews. The sudden conversion of Scarborough Shoal into a de facto Chinese outpost left Manila scrambling to protect its sovereign rights while grappling with domestic outrage over the loss of vital livelihood zones. Regionally, ASEAN’s credibility waned as smaller claimant states questioned whether the bloc’s consultative mechanisms possessed any real teeth.

2. Disregard for the ICA Ruling (2016)
Perhaps the most blatant example of China’s defiance came in 2016 when the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague ruled overwhelmingly in favour of the Philippines in its case against China. In its landmark judgement the court held that China’s historic “Nine-Dash Line” held no legal standing, and its island-building, fishing restrictions, and hydrocarbon activities violated Philippine sovereign rights. Instead of accepting defeat, China branded the decision “null and void,” refusing to participate in the proceedings or implement any of the tribunal’s directives.

Beijing’s dismissal of the PCA ruling underscored a cold calculation: international courts cannot enforce judgments without the cooperation of the losing party. By defiantly pressing on with land reclamation and military deployments, China signaled that its strategic objectives trumped any external adjudication. The immediate consequence was a profound erosion of faith in peaceful dispute resolution; Southeast Asian states, once hopeful that legal avenues might counter China’s heft, grew wary of challenging Beijing in court. Globally, allies of the United States and regional middle powers—Japan, Australia, and India—found themselves compelled to shore up “rules-based” coalitions, fearing a world where powerful states could ignore multilateral judgments with impunity.

3. Militarising the Spratly and Paracel Islands (2002)
Under the 2002 ASEAN–China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, signatories vowed to exercise “self-restraint” and avoid “actions that would complicate or escalate disputes,” specifically militarization. Nonetheless, starting in earnest around 2013, China embarked on an unprecedented land reclamation campaign across the Spratly and Paracel archipelagos. Satellite imagery revealed dredged sand and coral piling up to form artificial islets, which soon sprouted airstrips capable of handling fighter jets, hardened aircraft shelters, radar installations, and surface-to-air missile batteries.

The strategic logic was unmistakable: transform outposts into “unsinkable aircraft carriers” that could extend China’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) envelope hundreds of miles from its mainland coasts. Such installations not only consolidate Beijing’s claims but also pose a direct challenge to U.S. naval operations tasked with maintaining freedom of navigation. ASEAN members fiercely protested this violation of the 2002 pledge, but with no formal enforcement mechanism in the South China Sea regime, China’s island-fortresses became a new status quo. Consequently, the U.S. ramped up its Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs), sailing warships within 12 nautical miles of contested features, while Quad partners (Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S.) began coordinating patrols and exercises to reassure Southeast Asian states of their security commitments.

4. The ADIZ in the East China Sea (2013)
In November 2013, Beijing announced an Air Defense Identification Zone that encompassed nearly all of the East China Sea, including the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands—administered by Japan but claimed by China. Without prior notice to Tokyo or Washington, China required all foreign civilian and military aircraft to submit flight plans and identify themselves, or face “emergency defensive measures.” This abrupt extension of airspace claims breached existing Sino-Japanese crisis-management arrangements designed to prevent accidental escalation.

China’s motive was to assert aerial sovereignty over an increasingly contested space and test both Japan’s resolve and the U.S. alliance pledge. Predictably, Tokyo rejected the ADIZ and, with U.S. encouragement, continued its own flights without filing into Beijing’s identification system. U.S. B-52 bombers deliberately traversed the zone without notifying Beijing, underscoring both Washington’s rejection of unilateral revisionism and its commitment to uphold open skies. The incident entrenched mutual suspicion: Japan accelerated defense modernization, deepening cooperation with the U.S., Australia, and India, while China’s rhetoric glorified the ADIZ as a symbol of its “new stature,” further polarizing Northeast Asia.

5. The Haiyand Shiyou 981 Oil Rig Incident (2014)
April 2014 witnessed another pivotal showdown when China deployed the Haiyang Shiyou 981 deep-water drilling rig into waters within Vietnam’s Exclusive Economic Zone. Though Hanoi and Beijing had once pursued joint hydrocarbon exploration, Beijing’s unilateral placement of the rig violated both the spirit and letter of their prior understanding. Accompanied by a flotilla of Chinese coast guard and naval vessels, the rig triggered confrontations with Vietnamese patrol boats, who were met with water-cannon blasts and aggressive maneuvering.

China’s decision to press ahead—despite explicit pacts—stemmed from a desire to exploit sea-floor resources and gauge regional pushback under the shadow of global crises elsewhere, notably Ukraine. In Vietnam, the standoff ignited domestic outrage; public protests targeted Chinese businesses, and anti-China riots spilled into major cities. Hanoi, chastened, accelerated its diplomatic outreach to the U.S., India, and Japan, seeking security assurances and expanding naval acquisitions. Cracks appeared in ASEAN solidarity as Cambodia and Laos, heavily reliant on Chinese investment, muted collective statements, highlighting Beijing’s ability to leverage economic dependencies to neuter regional rebuke.

6. The Galwan Clash (2020)
Far from the low-lying shoals of the South China Sea, China’s border with India has witnessed its own pattern of broken pledges. The 1993 and 1996 agreements on the maintenance of peace and tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) strictly prohibited forward deployment of heavy equipment, construction of permanent structures, and aggressive patrolling. Yet by 2020, an infrastructure-laden People’s Liberation Army had aggressively pushed into disputed high-altitude passes, culminating in a violent clash at Galwan Valley that left at least 20 Indian soldiers and four Chinese troops dead—the first combat fatalities along the LAC in nearly five decades.

Beijing’s incursions appear aimed at signaling displeasure with India’s strengthening ties to the U.S. and Quad partners, and pre-empting Indian road and airstrip improvements. The aftermath was fierce: India banned scores of Chinese mobile applications, imposed higher tariffs on Chinese imports, and accelerated defense partnerships with Washington, Canberra, and Tokyo. Diplomatic relations cooled; trust was shattered, and both sides now maintain tens of thousands of troops in standoff positions across multiple sectors of the LAC, injecting enduring tension into one of the world’s most sensitive frontiers.

7. Ignoring UNESCO’s Clarion Call (2015)
Beyond sovereignty and security, China’s reef-reclamation spree wreaked ecological havoc. UNESCO, responsible for safeguarding World Heritage Sites and natural landmarks, repeatedly warned in 2015 and thereafter that China’s dredging destroyed coral reef systems—some of the most biodiverse marine habitats on Earth. These warnings came with calls for comprehensive environmental impact assessments. China, however, forged ahead, completing reclamation on more than 3,200 acres of reefs, irreversibly altering ecosystems, endangering migratory bird patterns, and jeopardizing fisheries that sustain coastal communities.

By sidelining UNESCO’s objections, Beijing further tarnished its international image—framed domestically as a responsible global leader—while depriving regional states of ecological cooperation that might have moderated its actions. The episode underscores that China’s breach of trust extends beyond legal and diplomatic promises into broader norms of global governance.

China’s maritime and territorial conduct, examined across these eight flashpoints, reveals a calculated blueprint: use diplomatic platitudes to delay, exploit gaps in enforcement regimes, and employ incremental force to reshape facts on the ground. While Beijing proclaims its support for a rules-based order, its actions demonstrate selective adherence to norms it has had a hand in drafting, and outright dismissal of those it did not author. Ultimately, the question facing Asia and the wider world is whether perseverance in diplomatic engagement can rehabilitate the region’s eroded trust, or whether deterrence and containment are the only pathways to preserving a semblance of order.

 

 

Samayeta Bal (Advocate enrolled with the BCI, LAMP Fellow 2024-25)

An advocate and a public policy professional with penchant and knowledge of both the worlds. She writes in topics pertaining to public policy, geopolitics and international relations.

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