CommentariesJULY 25, 2026

𝐀 𝐃𝐢𝐯𝐢𝐝𝐞𝐝 𝐇𝐨𝐮𝐬𝐞 – 𝐋𝐞𝐠𝐚𝐜𝐲 𝐯𝐬 𝐑𝐞𝐚𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲: 𝐅𝐫𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐞 𝐢𝐧 𝐍𝐒𝐂𝐍 (𝐈𝐌) & 𝐑𝐢𝐬𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐑𝐢𝐯𝐚𝐥 𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐯𝐢𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐚𝐥 𝐆𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐢𝐧 𝐌𝐲𝐚𝐧𝐦𝐚𝐫

Team Red Lantern Analytica

Directorate of Intelligence

N𝐞𝐰 𝐏𝐮𝐛𝐥𝐢𝐜𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 | 𝐑𝐞𝐝 𝐋𝐚𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐧 𝐀𝐧𝐚𝐥𝐲𝐭𝐢𝐜𝐚

Red Lantern Analytica presents a new strategic analysis: “𝐀 𝐃𝐢𝐯𝐢𝐝𝐞𝐝 𝐇𝐨𝐮𝐬𝐞 – 𝐋𝐞𝐠𝐚𝐜𝐲 𝐯𝐬 𝐑𝐞𝐚𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲: 𝐅𝐫𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐮𝐫𝐞 𝐢𝐧 𝐍𝐒𝐂𝐍 (𝐈𝐌) & 𝐑𝐢𝐬𝐞 𝐨𝐟 𝐭𝐡𝐞 𝐑𝐢𝐯𝐚𝐥 𝐏𝐫𝐨𝐯𝐢𝐬𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐚𝐥 𝐆𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐢𝐧 𝐌𝐲𝐚𝐧𝐦𝐚𝐫.”

Authored by Lt. Col. Ujjual Abhishek Jha, DCPP (Retd.), this examines the recent organisational split within NSCN (IM), the emergence of the Eastern Flank-led Provisional Government, and its implications for the Naga peace process, cross-border insurgency, and India’s security landscape in the Northeast.

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A Divided House Legacy vs Reality Fracture in NSCM-IM and Rise of the Rival Provisional Government in Myanmar

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COMMENTARIESAUGUST 20, 2026

Evergrande’s Fall Exposes the Deeper Fault Lines in China’s Property-Led Growth Model

The sentencing of Hui Ka Yan, Xu Jiayin, founder of the China Evergrande Group, to life in prison marks the conclusion of more than just the fall of one of China’s biggest businessmen. Hui was found guilty of eight offenses, including fraud, misappropriation of funds, securities violations, and bribery. Evergrande, formerly the largest real estate developer in China by contracted sales, turned to almost all of its $300 billion plus liabilities. Hui’s trial may mark the end of a significant legal case, but the Evergrande case does not end the massive economic case Evergrande came to represent. China’s real estate bubble was not a tale of just increasing house prices. It involved a tightly connected system of households, developers, banks, and local governments. Property became the main wealth purchasing and saving vehicle for Chinese households. In a survey by the People’s Bank of China, 59.1% of urban households’ assets were held in the form of housing, and the home ownership rate was 96%. Increasing house prices had an effect beyond an increase in construction. House prices had a positive effect on household wealth perceptions, confidence, and consumption. For developers, the system was designed to incentivize expansion. Land was bought and presold apartments, loans made it possible for developers to start new projects, and growing property evaluations enabled more borrowing. Evergrande was one of the developers who pushed the system the farthest. It can be described as the “three highs” consisting of high turnover, high costs, and high leverage. Evergrande’s model was to raise capital, buy land on a massive scale, and begin development while also borrowing against their land and starting the cycle over. So long as lenders continued to lend and buyers continued to buy, investors and developers alike continued to benefit from the cycle and the land and housing prices continued to grow. Local government interests were aligned with the developers. After the 1994 tax-sharing reform, the central government gained more revenue, leaving local governments shouldering a greater financial burden. To offset some of the burden, local governments sold land to developers and used land as collateral for loans. By 2019, it is calculated that local governments’ reliance on land finance was at 38.6 percent, with over 50 percent in many large cities. Property prices and local government finance and debt fuelled a cycle of increasing infrastructure spending. This outlines how vital property investment became for China. The IMF put the contribution of property to the economy at up to 20 percent. However, this number does not even come close to capturing the extent of property’s reach. Building property creates the need for the transport of raw materials. That includes steel, cement, and glass, as well as the machines to build the property, appliances, and furniture. Glass and machinery need to be transported using logistics and financial services. Property building employs contractors. Developers take out mortgages and corporate loans. Local governments earn money from the sale of land. So, property not only includes one of many sectors of the economy, but becomes a complete economic system. It becomes very clear how this system would collapse if the opposite of what is expected were to occur. This is the nature of a bubble. Every apartment does not become worthless. It means that the cost of the property, along with construction and the loans used to finance the purchase, became more dependent on whether people thought the price and demand for property would continue to rise. If people begin to think the cost of property will fall, then the same thing happens in the opposite order. Buyers will delay purchases, developers will not earn presale income, government revenue will fall, and banks will be more cautious of extending loans. Beijing recognized the risks so they began to tighten financial regulations starting in 2016. In 2020, The “Three Red Lines” Framework was established. Beijing’s goal was to limit debt for highly leveraged developers. From a macroeconomic standpoint it was necessary to limit debt. The problem was that leverage had become endemic throughout the system. It was really wishful thinking that it would discipline poorly managed developers because it made the business models of other driven companies more dependent on constantly selling new property and taking out new loans to continuously refinance debt. Evergrande exemplified the most famous case of China’s real estate collapse. Their failure impacted far more than themselves. Suppliers weren’t getting paid, construction companies went bankrupt and halted their projects, buyers had to wait to get their newly financed homes, and the creditors began to doubt the feasibility of their investments. Media states that Evergrande’s liquidation is slow and only $255 million of assets were sold by August of 2025 with claims against those assets totalling $45 billion. The possibility of China suffering a sudden replication of America’s 2008 “Lehman moment” is low. China’s financial system is more state-controlled, and the major banks are capable of being directed to provide support. Further, the capacity of Beijing to avoid excessive failure is far higher than the capacity of America at that same part in its history. The more likely threat is a prolonged balance-sheet adjustment where weakness in the property market will slow economic activity for many years. This trend continues through 2026. In July, Chinese new-home prices fell by 3.2% compared to the previous year. Of the 70 cities monitored, only 17 showed an increase in prices from the previous month. The first 7 months of the year also showed declining trends in property sales, investment, and new construction. During this period, the revenue of the Chinese government from land sales declined by 31.5% and was recorded at 977.8 billion yuan. These figures show a weakening trend in property and reflect declining private investment and local government finances. This trend is most problematic for households. When the primary investment of a household falls in value, households become more conservative. Household wealth falls and household members that own houses feel poorer, even if they have no intention of selling.

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COMMENTARIESAUGUST 21, 2025

Reimagining Oman as an Indian Ocean Green Hub: Looking at a Post-Carbon Future

The few stereotypes that persist regarding the Gulf are of its importance as a hydrocarbon centre over the past eight decades, since Bahrain and Saudi Arabia struck Oil in the 1930s. Oman, in comparison, struck Oil in Fahud in 1962, and shipped its first container from Mina Al Fahal in 1967. The oil revenues formed the bedrock of rebuilding the country during the 1970s, during which the Dhofar rebellion was still on. Oman is a Shell country, like Brunei, where Shell has been strategic in the country’s hydrocarbon exploration through a major stake in Petroleum Development Oman, or PDO, as commonly known. Many PDO employees have worked for Shell Brunei and Shell Sarawak as a part of their career circulations in the global MNC network. Oman was never a massive producer of petroleum as its wealthier neighbours in the GCC, even though its natural gas imprint is significant. Natural Gas is a key transition fuel, and Quriyat LNG in Sur has many long-term contracts with Korea, China, and Japan. However, Oil and Gas still form a major chunk of the GDP in Oman. Diversification has been on the agenda since the late 1980s, as localisation has always been a priority. Years of peak oil prices have led to the creation of avant-garde infrastructure and the education of a couple of generations overseas on scholarships, which was a byproduct of oil income. Now, the scenario has evolved as Oman’s population has increased, and the youth seeking work is often the refrain, as gauged from the comments section in the social media feeds. The cause of the Arab Spring protests in Sohar was corruption and lack of jobs, which led to a few heads turning. The post Sultan Qaboos era, under the able leadership of His Majesty Sultan Haitham Bin Tarik has moved towards diversification in a major way, seeking relationships far and wide. His Majesty has had meetings with the Dutch Leadership, President Putin in Moscow, Prime Minister Modi in Delhi, and the UK Minister Starmer within the past few months. The rich legacy of Oman being the Switzerland of the Middle East helps in its vital role in mediating the Yemeni crisis and as a trusted participant in the Iran paradigm, helps. Oman also controls half of the crucial Straits of Hormuz. Ibadhi Oman’s history as a littoral maritime empire has its long shadow in the present. Muscat is a diverse place, full of Zanzibaris, Baluchis, Ajmi’s, Lawati’s, and Hindu Bania’s, and other communities who were a part of the Omani imperial grid. The strategic culture of the Omani elite is transnational, with many Omani having ties across East Africa to Africa. Pankaj Khimji, an advisor to the Omani government, is a key Bania interlocuter between Muscat and Delhi via Mandvi. India and Oman have finalised the FTA negotiations recently. Aden was governed by the Bombay Presidency until 1937. These close ties entail prospects of power being exported to India/ Pakistan/East Africa via a subsea cable in the future. The engineering and program management excellence achieved by the national building efforts of PDO, especially in terms of talent development for the renewable sector, over the past decades. The first solar project was helmed by PDO as seen in the Amin Solar project. This is similar to the Aramco State, where the best expertise in Saudi Arabia lies with the engineers in the oil major. A glimpse of it was illustrated in Ellen R Wald’s book[1], which showed the role National Oil Companies have played in nation-building. Oman’s location as an Indian Ocean actor was confirmed with it hosting the Indian Ocean Conference this year in Muscat, where Member of Parliament Naveen Jindal ji spoke. Jindal operates one of the largest steel mills in the Middle East in Sohar. The ACME Group is coming up with a green hydrogen facility in the special economic zone in Duqm on the Arabian Sea coast. Duqm is also home to a naval base, which plays host to many navies, as it is close to the Horn of Africa piracy corridor. The green hydrogen corridor in Al Wusta and Dhofar is underway as ACWA Power from Saudi Arabia is investing in a green hydrogen facility in the southern Dhofar region. Another ACWA Power project in the form of Ibri 2 IPP is a project I know rather intimately. I was the lead social specialist for an impact assessment report for a multi-million-dollar 500MW solar park on the Saudi border. Long-term migrant workers from South Asia were identified as camel farmers in the desert on project land., However, during a recce visit and after speaking to long-term migrant workers looking after camels, we discovered that they were extremely precarious, relying on a solar-powered battery charger for mobile phones and to light a bulb. These workers, who were heavily reliant on precarious work, were being moved away from their off-grid homes to build a Chinese-funded solar park in relatively prosperous Oman. The irony was not lost on me. Globally accepted ESG governance norms kicked in, the move triggered an independent Resettlement Action Plan for these workers. Climate and Local developmental politics intersect in the middle of nowhere. The Beijing-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or AIIB is the backer for the Ibri 2 Project, and Chinese contractors were the hands on Ibri 2. Belt and Road is right on our doorstep. Indian Engineers and Consultants work on these Chinese-funded projects as the technical hands behind the scenes. There are numerous other solar projects in the pipeline in the Wilayat of Manah. These areas are close to the Saudi Border and could be a part of an integrated GCC power grid. Oman’s great strength in terms of land needed for renewable projects is a plus, along with its positioning between the Gulf, South Asia, and East Africa, which makes it an Indian Ocean Green Hub[2] in the making. [1] https://www.amazon.in/Saudi-Inc-Arabian-Kingdom%60s-Pursuit/dp/168177660X [2] https://mem.gov.om/en-us/Our-Business/Renewable-Energy-and-Hydrogen/Renewable-Energy-and-Hydrogen-Projects Authored By: Manishankar Prasad PhD Scholar, University of Malaya

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COMMENTARIESMAY 27, 2025

When The Dragon Meets The Elephant In Africa

In 2023 the world witnesses a watershed moment in geopolitics when under the presidency of India. The African Union joined the G20. This move was more than symbolic as it reflected the continent’s growing geopolitical relevance and the shifting axis of global power toward the Global South. But this inclusion also sharpened the spotlight on a silent contest already underway between China’s entrenched presence and India’s expanding engagement across Africa. With historical ties, soft power, and developmental diplomacy as key levers, India is now confronted with both an opportunity and a challenge as to how to engage a rising Africa without becoming a shadow of China’s state-capitalist model. While both India and China deploy state-backed finance to win friends and advance strategic interests in Africa, their approaches differ fundamentally in structure, cost, transparency and developmental impact. India primarily offers concessional Lines of Credit (LoCs) through EXIM Bank at low (1-2%) or zero interest rates, which often carries a long repayment horizon (15–20 years) with grace periods of 5–7 years. By keeping projects untied and rates concessional, Delhi minimizes the risk of debt distress and asset-for-debt swaps. China’s commercial interest rates can run as high as 3–6%, with ballooning penalty structures for delayed service, and shorter tenors (5-10 years) with minimal or no grace period. India does not wait for a country to default in order to extract political or territorial concessions. China on the other hand holds sway through “debt-for-equity” or “resource-backed” clauses: inability to service debt can lead to control of railways, ports or energy assets. This divergence in approach is increasingly resonating with African nations that are now seeking sustainable development rather than debt dependency. China’s ties with Africa dates back to 1950s when it supported post-colonial liberation movements in Africa. Since the early 2000s, China’s involvement at just face value has been nothing short of transformative in scale. Through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), being has poured over 180 billion dollars into the continent, financing over 3000 infrastructure projects. From railways in Kenya and Nigeria to ports in Djibouti and pipelines in Angola, China’s infrastructural footprint spans virtually every corner of Africa. The Addis Abba-Djibouti railway, the Nairobi-Mombasa Standard Gauge railway, and the massive hydropower dams in Zambia and Ethiopia are often cited examples of China’s visible contributions. However, behind the concrete and steel lie contracts laced with opacity, commercial loans with steep repayment terms and a financing model that increasingly resembles a predatory web. A growing number of African nations have found themselves ensnared in what is now referred to as China’s ‘debt-trap diplomacy’. The pattern is consistent, Beijing provides large loans with high commercial interest rates and short repayment windows, often secured against strategic national assets or resources. Crucially, these contract are shrouded in secrecy, rarely disclosed to parliaments or the public. The execution of the projects is dominated by Chinese state-owned enterprises, which import Chinese labour and materials, limiting the developmental spill overs for local economies. Djibouti is one of the clearest examples of Chinese debt-trap diplomacy. The small horn of Africa, strategically located at the mouth of the Res Sea, owes more than 70% external debt to China, largely tied to infrastructure projects like the Doraleh Multipurpose Port and the Addis Abba-Djibouti railway. In exchange of these investments, Djibouti granted China the rights to build its first overseas military base therefore serving geopolitical purposes for Beijing. Similarly, Zambia borrowed billions from Chinese lenders notably for Kariba Dam rehabilitation and the Kenneth Kaunda International Airport expansion, which finally led to it becoming the first African country to default on its debt. Under a ‘resource-backed loan’ model, Angola too pledged its future oil revenues to repay loans extended for roads, hospitals and office buildings. This arrangement has left Angola with crippling debt, poverty, illiteracy, and reduced fiscal flexibility. Kenya suffers the same dilemma as the Chinese funded Standard Gauge Railway has now pushed the country’s public debt to over 70% of its GDP. By 2017, the Republic of Congo’s debt had ballooned to over 115% of GDP, one of the major reasons for which was the weight of large debts to China. This situation was seen as a test case for International Monetary Fund, as it had issued a bailout for Congo, and many believed more countries in the African continent are going to turn to IMF for the very same reason. While Chinese investments have undeniably built roads, railways, and ports across Africa, the long-term development benefits remain highly questionable. In many cases, the infrastructure does not translate into real economic transformation due to poor integration, unsustainable financing, and low local ownership. The debt-trap narrative is not just rhetoric it is a real phenomenon that is stalling African development and threatening sovereignty. On the other hand, India’s relations with Africa is marked by long-standing, historical, emotional and ideological roots. While China has been treating Africa as investment, India is treating Africa as a partner. As several African countries grow wary of China’s opaque loans and aggressive asset control tactics, India is seizing the opportunity to position itself as a genuine development partner. This is most visible in its expanding presence in East, West, and Southern Africa. One of the most prominent examples of India’s constructive engagement is Ethiopia, where India has invested 5 billion dollars in pharmaceuticals, textiles, and agriculture, making it among the top three foreign investors. The Ethio-India Innovation Centre is a symbol of India’s focus on tech-driven, locally adapted development. India’s Lines of Credit worth over $12 billion have supported more than 200 projects in over 40 African countries like Kenya, Tanzania, Ghana etc. These projects are transparent, demand-driven, and mostly untied, meaning African nations choose their contractors and design the scope of the projects, avoiding the pitfalls of Chinese dependency on its own companies and labour. India financed the sectors like healthcare, and renewable energy in Uganda, areas often neglected by China. Under Vaccine Maitri, India has also been

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